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
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
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GREEK EDUCATION

Edited by the Hon. Mr. J. E. B. BAKER
With a Preface by the Hon. Mr. J. E. B. BAKER
Second Edition, revised and enlarged
London: Cambridge University Press, 1902

Printed by the University Press, Cambridge

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

London: FETTER LANE, E.C.

C. F. CLAY, MANAGER



Edinburgh: 100, PRINCES STREET

Berlin: A. ASHER AND CO.

Leipzig: F. A. BROCKHAUS

New York: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

Bombay and Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.

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GREEK EDUCATION

ITS PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLES

BY

JAMES DREVER

M.A. (EDIN.), B.SC. (LOND.)

LECTURER ON THE PRINCIPLES AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION
UNDER THE EDINBURGH PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE
TRAINING OF TEACHERS, AND ASSISTANT TO THE
PROFESSOR OF EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY
OF EDINBURGH

Cambridge :
at the University Press

1912

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PREFACE

THE main purpose of the author in publishing this little work is to indicate what seem to him the essential lines upon which any discussion of Greek education, that is to be of value to the student of Education, must proceed. At the same time he has tried to throw out the suggestion that the whole history of educational practice and educational thought may be treated from the same point of view, and as a whole, by taking our departure from the education of Greece. Quite obviously this little book does not attempt a full and detailed treatment, descriptive, interpretive, and critical, of Greek education, but merely gives a sketch of the dominant and important features, a sketch, which must be filled in by wider reading.

It must be remembered also, that it is not written by a classical scholar for classical scholars, but by a student of Education for students of Education. The writer would fain hope that it will lead some such students to a further study of the education of the Greeks, so that they may derive from such study that insight and inspiration, which contact with Greek civilization, and not least its educational aspect, almost invariably yields.

In conclusion the author desires to place on record his indebtedness to Nettleship's *Lectures on the Republic of Plato* and his *Theory of Education in the Republic of Plato*, in Abbott's *Hellenica*, for invaluable guidance in the study of Plato's educational thought, and also, though more incidentally, to many other works, which will be found enumerated in the bibliography at the end. He would also thank, for encouragement, and many valuable suggestions, Dr John Gunn.

J. D.

EDINBURGH,

25 *April* 1912.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

No mistake is more frequent than to assume that the education of Ancient Greece, just because it is 'ancient,' has merely a historical significance. Greek education may still at the present day be said to be significant *educationally* as well as historically. From the historian's point of view the history of a civilization must be regarded as incomplete, so long as it does not include the history of the means employed, either consciously or unconsciously, to bring up the younger generation in such a way as to maintain the traditions, institutions, and characteristic attitudes of that civilization; that is, the history of the system or systems of education. Regarded in this way the history of education constitutes a chapter in the history of every great civilization. Hence the history of Greek education is a chapter in the history of Greek civilization, the history of Roman education in that of Roman civilization, the history of Modern education in that of Modern civilization. Still taking the historian's point of view, and considering the historical significance of Greek education, we may trace important influences in Roman education derived from the earlier Greek development, and in Modern education derived from both educational developments of the Ancient World, if, indeed, there were two, and not one development continued with some slight, though characteristic, modifications through Roman times. The historical significance of Greek education is therefore fairly obvious.

But Greek education is still more significant from the educational point of view. We might conceivably at the present day have reached a stage of development at which no lessons could be learned from the educational systems and educational practice of the Ancient World, even though we could trace historically the influence of these systems right on to the present time. But as a matter of fact we have not yet reached such a stage. Greek education may still furnish lessons for the educational theorist and for the practical teacher of to-day. The history of Greek educational practice and Greek educational thought can throw some light on many problems still unsolved.

But there is a point of view, which educational writers in the past seem to have overlooked, from which the history of Greek educational thought especially is of the greatest importance, and, in comparatively recent times, has increased, instead of diminishing, in significance. In the history of educational thought, so far as Western Civilization is concerned, there are two great periods or epochs, the Modern Period, in which we live, which may be said to begin with Rousseau¹, and the Greek Period, which may be said to have begun in Homeric times and terminated when the Modern Period began. This may appear a somewhat startling statement to make. But consider the facts. At a certain stage in the development of the civilization of Ancient Greece, some of the finest intellects this world has seen applied themselves to the study of the problems of education and made explicit as theory the best of what had long been implicit in Greek educational practice. The educational thought of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle was concerned with the most fundamental aspects of education, originated and developed ultimate views of the meaning and

¹ The writer was very much interested to find, after he had written this, that the most recent writer on the educational theory of Rousseau, Dr Boyd, substantially agrees with this estimate of Rousseau's significance in educational history.

aim of education, and bequeathed to succeeding centuries a full-grown⁷ Philosophy and Science of Education. To this educational thought no succeeding Greek thinker made any material addition. Cicero and Quintilian, the leading Romans who concerned themselves with the theory and practice of education, accepted it, and merely gave it a Roman interpretation, without themselves undertaking a reinvestigation of fundamental principles. The Renaissance scholars and educationists in turn accepted the Roman interpretation by Cicero and Quintilian. The presuppositions underlying the educational theories of Erasmus and of Milton, of Locke and of Comenius, are the principles which were developed by Plato and Aristotle. Only within recent times, and as a result of the movement initiated by Rousseau, has a reinvestigation of these presuppositions been undertaken. In writers like Montaigne and Locke there are, it is true, indications which point towards the New Education of the present. But all educational writers previous to Rousseau, and some after him, are distinctly of the Old Education, and the Old Education at its best, the Old Education in its most defensible form, is the Education of Plato and Aristotle.

There is nothing to be gained by labouring this point. The more we consider the matter, the more irresistibly are we driven to such a conclusion. But think what it means with respect to the significance of Plato and Aristotle for present-day educational thought! A new development of educational thought is taking place at the present time, so new that it constitutes the beginning of a new epoch in the history of Education. Since Plato and Aristotle there has been no development of educational thought at all comparable in importance to theirs till the present time. The leaders in the present movement are once more concerning themselves with fundamentals, with the presuppositions which underlie all educational theory and practice, and the importance to them of the last such movement is almost too obvious to require

explicit statement. The new educational thought, which is shaping itself under the influence of Rousseau and Froebel, and represented to-day by Dewey and others, cannot safely develop without looking for guidance to the thought of the Greeks. 'Education for Efficiency' cannot entirely ignore 'Education for Culture,' which itself started as an 'Education for Efficiency.' We are of the Modern World, but our fathers, so far as educational theory is concerned, were of the Greek World.

We may sum up under two heads the characteristics of Greek education, which, both historically and educationally, are most significant for modern civilization :

1. In the first place Greek education is significant for the light which it throws on the relation of the individual to the State, and more especially because of its emphasis on individual development and individual freedom, under circumstances and conditions, which make the phenomenon unique in human history.

2. In the second place Greek education is significant as furnishing us with the earliest definitely and clearly formulated conception of what constitutes a 'liberal education,' a conception that in its essentials endured for centuries, and is only now being radically modified.

As regards the first point Greek education stands in sharp contrast to all Oriental educational developments ; as regards both it is only less near to us at the present day than is the education (say) of Germany.

PART I

GREEK EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE

INTRODUCTION

It is usual to recognize in the history of Greek education two periods, each with special characteristics of its own. These periods are known respectively as the Old Education and the New Education, and the dividing line between them is drawn at the Age of Pericles. Each of these periods may also be considered as divided into two sub-periods, when we have something like the following classification :

- | | | |
|-----------------------|---|--|
| I. The Old Education | { | 1. Homeric Period. <i>natural</i> |
| | { | 2. Historical Period. |
| II. The New Education | { | 1. Transition Period. <i>cosmopolite</i> |
| | { | 2. Hellenistic Period. |

The Homeric Period may be considered as extending from about 1000 B.C. to 800 B.C., the Historical Period of the Old Education from 800 B.C. to 450 B.C., the Transition Period to the New Education from 450 B.C. to 300 B.C., and the Hellenistic Period from that date to the closing of the philosophical schools at Athens in 529 A.D.

These periods do not quite correspond with the accepted historical and literary epochs. But this non-correspondence is exactly what we ought to expect, for the modification of a system of education is almost always one of the results of influences which show themselves previously in the history and literature of a people. The main differences between the Old Education and the New may be very briefly expressed. The Old Education was national, the New cosmopolitan. During the period of the Old Education the State was supreme, and the individual was regarded as existing for the State; under the regime of the New Education individualism became more and more prominent, until finally it became predominant. Finally each was dominated by its own characteristic ideals of culture, and as a natural consequence each had its own characteristic educational practice.

CHAPTER I

THE OLD EDUCATION

WE know exceedingly little of the education of the Homeric Period, but what we do know shows clearly that the Greek ideal, as we find it in historical times, had already to a certain extent developed, and was already aimed at in such education as there was. The education of the Homeric Period is usually regarded as summed up in the words which Homer puts into the mouth of Phoenix the tutor of Achilles :

Τοῦνεκά με προέηκε διδασκέμεναι τάδε πάντα
μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων.

(*Il.* IX. 443.)

‘For this end he (Peleus) sent me forth, to teach thee all these things, to be a speaker of wise words, and a doer of valiant deeds.’ Eloquence and valour, or the man of wise speech and brave action, may thus be considered as the Greek ideal of Homeric times. Odysseus and Achilles are the corresponding types. Consciously or unconsciously the education of the Homeric Greeks aimed at wise words and brave deeds. It must of course have been largely informal and entirely, or almost entirely, through practice, such instruction as there was being of relatively minor significance, but the germ of Greek education was undoubtedly there.

We may say, therefore, that Homeric education is of considerable interest and importance, as showing the very early recognition among the Greeks of the two aspects of education, the physical and the intellectual. It is thoroughly characteristic of the Old Education in Greece that these two aspects are always placed side by side in a way that implies almost equal emphasis. In historical times we find two recognized kinds of education, physical and intellectual, and two recognized school subjects, Gymnastics and Music, both being understood, especially the latter, in a wide sense. However radically different the two developments of Greek education, which we find typified by the education of the Spartans and the Athenians, may have been in other respects, this at least was a common characteristic. Culture, both physical and intellectual, Gymnastics and Music, deeds and words,—these are constant features of Greek education during the Old Education period. NA

We must not, however, make the mistake so often made of regarding Homeric civilization as young and vigorous, as, in fact, the beginning of the later development of Greek civilization in historical times. It was evidently, on the contrary, an old civilization just passing away. The historical Greek civilization was a new development, borrowing, it is true, some of the elements of the older civilization, but with other elements characteristically its own, and borrowing still others from foreign and Semitic civilizations. In so far as the Homeric ideal and aim in education was characteristically Greek, that was naturally retained. That, and the Homeric poems themselves, which for centuries remained one of the chief means of education among the Greeks, and among the Romans after them, were, from the educational point of view, the chief heritage left to succeeding generations by Homeric civilization.

It is in historical times that we first find definite educational systems in Greece. As we have already indicated there were considerable differences between the education developed at

different centres, so considerable that it will be necessary for us to deal with two types, taking Sparta and Athens as representing these two types. Before doing so, however, it will be advisable to consider briefly the general conditions under which Greek educational systems were developed, and the main factors which must necessarily have exerted an influence upon them.

The racial characteristics of the Greeks themselves are the first of such factors. The Greek, as compared with other races, was imaginative, intensely intellectual, endowed with a fine sense of proportion, harmony, and restraint, and intensely 'human,' to use a term which Laurie has used, to describe what was probably most characteristic of all, but is at the same time most difficult to define. Wherever circumstances allowed it, these characteristics tended towards intellectual culture and individual freedom. The effects on education were, however, too indefinite and too intricate to trace in detail.

The second important factor was the social and political conditions of the Greeks—or, more briefly, Greek polity. We must always bear in mind that Ancient Greece was at no period of its history a nation in our modern sense, but an aggregate of independent city-states, possessing little in common with one another save race, language, and religion. On these, and practically on these alone, the unity, such as it was, of the Greek world in ancient times was based. Greece was never able to establish and maintain for any length of time even a federation of states.✓ One result of this was that extraordinary development of civic life which we find in Ancient Greece. This was itself of tremendous importance in the education of the Greek, regarded on its informal aspect. Further the society of Greece was a society served by slaves.✓ In older days idleness was called 'the sister of freedom.' It was this, of course, that afforded the opportunity to the Greeks for their development of the 'liberal education.' This was also the source of that peculiar prejudice with which the Greek regarded the exercise

of a handicraft, trade, or profession—with some notable exceptions. These were considered as fit for slaves rather than for free men. The general principle which the Greeks applied was, that it was unworthy of a free citizen, in fact something of a disgrace, to give up one's time to others for money.

The other factors we may group together as miscellaneous factors. These would include Religion, Art, Literature, Philosophy, commercial relations with other peoples, and general course of history, political, commercial, literary, and philosophical. Each and all had an influence on the development of education.

EDUCATION AT SPARTA.

Spartan education may be considered as typical of the education that prevailed among the Dorian Greeks. It was, as it were, a side issue in the development of Greek education, but it is important from two points of view. In the first place we may regard the Spartan system as an educational experiment. It then becomes of very great interest, since it was an experiment made under fairly well understood conditions, it was conducted for a sufficiently long time to enable the results to be estimated, both direct and indirect, both immediate and ultimate, and history has recorded for us these results. In the second place the Spartan system exerted considerable influence on all the great Greek educational theorists, but more especially on Xenophon and Plato. Some knowledge of it is, therefore, necessary in order to understand the development of Greek educational thought.

The Spartan system of education is largely explained by the social and political conditions under which it arose. In early times, probably about the Homeric age or soon after, the Dorian Greeks had migrated to the Peloponnesus. The invasion of the Peloponnesus, like the Danish invasion of England, had been made by independent bands, and these established

independent settlements in the new country. From one of such bands of Dorian Greeks sprang the state of Sparta. In most cases the invaders were gradually absorbed by the original inhabitants of the districts in which they settled, and any attempt to retain all political power in their own hands consequently failed. But this was not the case with Sparta. Here the ancient inhabitants never regained any political power or privileges. But, as an accompaniment of their exclusive political privileges, the Spartans had to reckon with the hostility of the unprivileged. Hence they were virtually compelled to maintain themselves like a small army encamped in the midst of a hostile country. It is this that gives us the key to the Spartan educational policy. For centuries Sparta remained little more than a large military camp, in the midst of a population deprived of all political rights, always hostile, and probably outnumbering the privileged citizens in the proportion of at least ten to one. The Spartans were so situated, therefore, that the safety of the State depended on their keeping up their soldierly habits. Consequently the whole life of the Spartans became a preparation for war.

The most striking characteristic of the Spartan educational system is the fact that it was a system under State control, education being conducted entirely by the State, at the expense of the State, and for the ends of the State. This also was a natural result of the conditions under which Sparta developed, and of the military basis on which the whole State was organized. The aim and ideal of Spartan education were similarly determined. The aim was to raise a body of hardy, brave, disciplined citizen-soldiers. The ideal may be best expressed in the terms 'fortitude of body and of mind.' A body trained to endure hunger, thirst, the pain of wounds, the fatigue of a long march, all extremes of temperature and climate, and a mind disciplined to implicit obedience, cool and alert in emergencies, and undismayed in the face of difficulty, danger, and even death, such was the Spartan aim and ideal in

education. ^{yes} But this is, after all, only a partial expression of the Spartan aim. [The final aim was a strong, self-reliant, and self-sufficient State. This was the point of view from which the individual was always regarded. Accordingly the human being was always absorbed in the citizen, and individual development as such had no place in the Spartan educational policy.]

The administration of the laws regarding education at Sparta was entrusted to a state official (*παιδονόμος*), the Minister of Education, as we should call him. He had under him subordinate officials called 'overseers' (*βιδιαῖοι*), whose main business seems to have been the supervision of the physical training. These officials had entire charge of the education of the Spartan boy and youth during the years from seven to thirty which constituted the period of compulsory education at Sparta. Periodical examinations were also held by the 'Ephors,' so that these chief magistrates of the Spartan state may be said to have generally superintended the work of education. And further every citizen was expected to exercise a general oversight over the conduct of the young, and to correct and instruct them whenever necessity should arise. In this we have a partially systematised informal education, supplementing the formal education under state control.

It was only during his first seven years that the Spartan boy had experience of home life. A child, immediately on birth, was examined by state officials. If it were strong and healthy, and free from physical deformity, then permission was given to the parents to rear it; if, on the other hand, the child were sickly or deformed, and did not satisfy the state officials, orders were given that it should be exposed on the mountains. The custom of exposing children prevailed throughout Greece. It did not always involve the death of the child, for some kind-hearted individual might find the child and rear it, but at Sparta it always meant that the child

was rejected as a future citizen of the State. After this preliminary examination there was, as a rule, no interference on the part of the State with the upbringing of a child, until it had completed its seventh year. [This period of home education was naturally the care of the mother. Chief attention was paid to physical health and physical development, and the results so impressed the rest of Greece that Lacedaemonian nurses were in high demand among wealthy families in other cities. Thus early the characteristically Spartan training was begun, the child being, from the earliest infancy, accustomed to suppress crying, to endure hunger, to remain in the dark without fear, in short, to make its first few infant steps towards the Spartan ideal of manhood.]

At the age of seven the Spartan boy was taken over by the State. He was transferred from his home to a kind of public boarding-school—or barracks, according to our point of view—and thenceforward the Minister of Education, and not his parents, was responsible for his upbringing, the entire cost of his education being defrayed from the state revenue. The Spartan boy never knew home life again, until, as a full citizen, he married and established a home of his own. Although the cost of a boy's education was borne by the State, there is no reason to suppose that he was fed at the expense of the State. In all probability each parent was bound to make a certain definite contribution for this purpose, the penalty for his failure to do so being, as in the case of the similar contribution to the public tables for adult citizens, loss of the rights of citizenship. One obvious result of this must have been the exclusion of the poorer citizens from the benefits of the state system of education.

The internal organization of a Spartan boarding-school was very simple. The boys were graded according to age in three classes, the first consisting of the boys from seven to twelve, the second of those from twelve to fifteen, and the third of those from fifteen to eighteen. The boys were further organized

in 'bands' (*ἵλαι*) and 'divisions.' Each 'band' had its own leader, chosen from among the boys themselves, but probably from a more advanced class, though this is by no means certain. In charge of each school, and probably also in charge of each 'division' was placed one of the Eirens or youths over twenty. We may consider this either a pupil-teacher system or a prefect system. The objects aimed at in this organization seem to have been two: on the one hand the Spartans wished to produce a certain definite type of character, on the other hand to utilize emulation and competition to the full. The work done in the schools consisted mainly of physical exercises, athletic games, and mimic warfare, and in all of these individuals were pitted against individuals, and 'bands' against 'bands.'

The physical training of the Spartan boy was of the severest description. He had to go barefoot winter and summer, and wore only a single garment. His food was of the plainest and scanty at that. His bed was of reeds cut from the banks of the river Eurotas. Punishments were frequent and severe, the Minister of Education himself being always attended by officials with the formidable title of 'floggers' (*μαστιγοφόροι*). These punishments were inflicted quite as much for the sake of physical training, that is training to endure physical pain, as to correct faults. In fact, in the case of the youths, there were regularly what we can only designate as 'whipping examinations.' Fighting with hands, feet and even teeth, was encouraged among boys, youths, and adult citizens alike, and the spirit of rivalry was so fierce that combatants sometimes died rather than acknowledge their defeat. Add to all this the fact that the exercises themselves were often—in fact generally—of an exhausting nature, and we get some idea of the kind of physical training which the Spartan boy received.

It is much more difficult to get an equally clear and definite conception of the intellectual education of the Spartans. This

difficulty arises from the fact that a great deal of the intellectual education was of the informal kind. Instruction in reading, writing, and arithmetic, if given at all, was confined to the merest rudiments, everything beyond what was necessary for the ordinary purposes of life being proscribed. But we must not jump to the conclusion that the Spartans were entirely deficient in literary culture. The laws were set to music, and they were learned by heart. Similarly the words of the various songs and hymns which the boys had to sing were committed to memory. Heroic ballads of the Greeks and the poems of Homer must also have been learned. On the authority of Aristotle, however, we know that music proper was at Sparta confined to singing, no instrumental music being taught.

But this was not all, nor even the chief part, of the intellectual education of the Spartan boy. Some of the other methods of securing the culture of the intellect were peculiar, but by no means unintelligible. One of these was the development of that pithy and concise speech, so characteristic that it has borne the name 'laconic' from that day to this. We read that the boys dined with the Eiren who was placed in charge of them, and, after the meal was finished, 'he ordered one of the boys to sing; to another he put some question which demanded a thoughtful answer, for example, who was the best man among the adult citizens, or what he thought of a certain action. The answer was to have a reason assigned for it, expressed briefly and concisely¹.' The training of a boy in this concise Spartan speech was also part of the duty of one particular citizen who seems to have regarded the boy as a kind of adopted son.

A still more peculiar feature of the Spartan system, which had also a distinct bearing upon intellectual development, at least on the development of initiative, resource, and self-reliance, was organized theft. Boys, even at an early age,

¹ Plutarch: *Lycurgus*.

were sent out, either to procure by stealing certain things for the Eiren in charge of them, or to get provisions for their own meals. The articles that might be stolen were fixed by law, so that we may regard them as common, rather than individual, property. The moral dangers of the system were thus minimized. \ If caught, a boy was punished, but for his clumsiness in allowing himself to be caught, not for the stealing.

Precisely the same difficulties are encountered in the attempt to get a clear idea of the moral education of the Spartans. Like the intellectual education, that was partly formal and partly informal, the latter being of considerably greater importance. \ On the formal side moral education was probably confined to instruction in Spartan law and custom, and discipline in unhesitating and unquestioning obedience.

| Morality, in the narrow sense, was mainly a state system, imposed with an iron hand from without. There was informal in addition to any formal education there may have been of this kind, for it was held to be the duty of every citizen to take an active part in the work of teaching and training the future citizens, and every citizen was therefore expected to correct on the spot any boy he found doing wrong, or, when an opportunity presented itself, to give instruction of a positive kind. We have also already had occasion to notice other characteristic Spartan usages which have a moral as well as an intellectual bearing.

The present tendency, as regards moral education, is to consider education and early life as a whole, and to attach great importance to factors which are not themselves directly moral, in the narrow sense of the word. From this point of view Spartan education is exceedingly interesting. Freeman in his *Schools of Hellas* makes the wise observation that, in some of their arrangements, 'the Spartans show a clear appreciation of boy-nature,' and, as a result, the Spartan streets were not, like the Athenian, full of young hooligans. The organization of the boys into 'bands' with boy leaders, the

legalised robbery expeditions, and the 'secret service' which was a similar element in the later education of the youths—these are all instances of the Spartan policy of affording a vent to, and utilizing, well-known tendencies of boy nature. Unfortunately for Sparta the valuable results of such a policy were more than counterbalanced by the manner in which the boys were denied an opportunity of developing a sense of responsibility, through their being kept so much under the supervision of their elders. In these respects the only thing to which we can compare Spartan education is a composite photograph of the English Public School and the French Lycée.

The most striking things about Spartan education, as a system, are the clearness and definiteness of the aim, and the complete and detailed organization of means to secure that aim. \ What was aimed at was a certain type of character, the Spartan type, as that has already been described, and individuality was deliberately suppressed, except individuality in the line of the Spartan ideal. The boarding-school system itself tends to rub off the corners of individuality. At Sparta everything was arranged on a similar basis, and there were practically no opposing influences. ✓

We have hitherto confined our attention to the education of a boy during the years of ordinary school life. It is necessary also to look for a short time at the training the youth and young man received after school days were over. After he had passed his eighteenth year, the Spartan boy began his professional training. The military profession was the only profession at Sparta. Professional training was therefore mainly—and more exclusively as the youth increased in years—a training in the art of war. ✓ The complete training occupied a period of twelve years, that is till the thirtieth year. The first two years consisted of what we might call a preparatory course. During these years the 'melleiren,' as he was called, devoted himself to the continuation of his gymnastics and dancing, together with preliminary work in military drill,

light skirmishing, and the use of arms. He came at this time more directly under the supervision of the 'overseers,' and had to undergo an examination before the Ephors every ten days, to make sure that his physical development was what it ought to be. In this period also he had to perform the duties of the 'secret service,' to which allusion has already been made. The chief of these duties was the carrying on of secret war against the 'helots' or slaves. The Ephors declared war on the slaves annually, so that no blood-guiltiness might attach to their assassination by the youths. The youths were sent in bands into the different districts. They wandered about the country, hiding in the woods, sleeping on the ground, and attending to their own wants. In the course of these wanderings they made sudden attacks on the slaves, and slew all who appeared to the rulers to be dangerous. Incidentally they became thoroughly acquainted with their own country, and obtained an invaluable training for warfare.

At the age of twenty the specific military training began. The 'eirens,' as the young men were called, were exercised in gymnastics of the severest kind, in riding, in swimming, and in exhausting dances. They lived on the coarsest food, and underwent a discipline as severe as that of an army in the field. It was contrary to the custom of the Greeks to send any but full-grown citizens to face the terrors of battle. Consequently the 'eirens' were not sent out to war, but they were expected to man the various fortresses, and a body of a hundred of the most distinguished among them accompanied the kings into the field, to serve as a body-guard.

It is almost inevitable, in describing Spartan education, to leave the impression, that, to the Spartans, physical training was the be-all and end-all of education. And yet this impression is essentially erroneous. It is only because we overlook the moral and intellectual side of their education that it arises, and we are apt to overlook the moral and intellectual side simply because of the great difference between the means used

by the Spartans and those used by us to secure the intellectual development of a human being. It is true that they laid great stress on physical training, but, however narrow their interpretation of the 'wise speech' of the Homeric period, they by no means neglected it.

\ The chief part in the intellectual and moral education of the young men was probably played by the 'public tables.' At these all the citizens and young men were expected to take their meals together. Most writers assign as the reason for the establishment of these public tables the repression of luxury. \ But Xenophon maintains, and probably rightly, that they were intended also to serve as a kind of school for the youth and younger citizens, and at all events they fulfilled this function. They were not maintained at the public expense, but each person was obliged to contribute a certain definite quantity of provisions every month, and the results of hunting expeditions, of which the Spartans were inordinately fond, formed an additional source of supply. The usual number at each table was fifteen, and each group of fifteen formed a small club, candidates for admission being ballotted for, and only admitted on a unanimous vote. Even after he had attained full citizenship, and possessed a home and wife of his own, the Spartan was still compelled to dine at these public tables.

\ The recognized position of woman was much higher in Sparta than in most other Greek states, and hence a defect almost characteristic of Ancient Greece—neglect of the education of the girls—was absent at Sparta. \ The girls were educated on practically the same lines as the boys, except that they were not taken away from their homes and brought up in state boarding-schools under the care of state officials. Their gymnastic training was perhaps not quite so severe, but it had the same end in view, the development of a strong and healthy body, in order that the race might not degenerate physically because of the want of physical development of the women. *ingenues*

Such is in brief a description of the system and practice of

education in Sparta. It may fairly be judged by the results which it produced. In the first place there can be no question ✓ that fine soldiers were turned out. States used to send to Sparta for a Spartan general to lead their armies. But the system was also intended to produce statesmen, albeit a somewhat narrow type, and in this respect it undoubtedly failed. ✓ Fettered by his narrow education and outlook, the Spartan could not appreciate large issues or a far-sighted policy. After the Peloponnesian War, when Sparta became practically mistress of Greece, it very soon became evident that, though she ✓ could conquer, she was absolutely unfit to rule Greece. Moreover the Spartans failed even to keep up with the development of the military art itself, and this in the long run proved their ruin. These defects, which history revealed, were due primarily to their ignoring the importance of a wide intellectual culture to supplement their physical training, and their refusing to pay the price which the development of initiative and responsibility requires.

✓ In the second place the system produced loyal and obedient citizens of the State, willing, at least in the best days, to shed their last drop of blood in its defence, and carefully observant of all its laws. On the other hand the Spartan obedience to the laws of the State was largely blind and unreasoning—just the sort of obedience that strict military discipline develops. ✓ Further the morality of the Spartan was a state system imposed from without, not a personal morality developed from within. The moral code according to which he guided his actions was on the same level in his eyes as the laws of the State, and he regarded it because he had been brought up to regard it in the strict and consistent Spartan fashion. But away from home, and freed from the iron discipline of Sparta, he was licentious, greedy, and neither just nor honourable in his dealings. The morality which was part of a cast-iron system ✓ to which he had to adjust himself never became morality in a true personal sense.

Lastly, the brutalizing tendency of the almost exclusive devotion to gymnastics and masculine pursuits had little to counteract it at Sparta. The whole State might be said to be organized on a basis of brute force, and it is vain to look for the finer traits of human nature, such as gentleness, tenderness, pity, or mercy. Aristotle criticises the Spartan system of education severely in this respect. Even home life, which might to a great extent have supplied what was lacking, was practically, or at least partially, destroyed by the institution of the public tables, and was entirely eliminated from the education of the boys after the age of seven, and until manhood and citizenship had been attained.

EDUCATION AT ATHENS.

It is at Athens that we find the education which is in the true line of descent between the education of the Homeric period and that of the present day, as it was at Athens that Greek education was really developed, and that the 'education of culture,' in something like the sense in which we understand it, first came into existence. This must not be interpreted to mean that Spartan education was not, properly speaking, of the Greek type, and did not aim at culture, in the way elsewhere characteristic of the Greeks. Such an idea is quite erroneous. The Spartans, like other Greeks, aimed at culture, that is physical excellence, intellectual development, and the building of character, in their education. But the meaning they attached to these things, as well as the way in which they sought them, appear strange to us, while we can understand and appreciate the Athenian position quite easily, because it is essentially our own.

The development, which took place at Athens, was possible, mainly because there was no cast-iron system, representing the State, and backed by the power of the State, to which the individual was compelled to adjust himself, and largely also

because of the multifarious interests of the Athenian citizen. There was no fundamentally different conception of the relationship between the individual and the State. Like the Spartans, the Athenians held the characteristically Greek view that the individual existed for the State, that the State was everything, the individual a mere unit. But the Athenians differed from the Spartans in their conception of the best way to realise the state ideal. At Athens it was held, at least by implication, that the full and free development of the individual, in the harmonious exercise of all his powers, was the best way to secure the happiness and prosperity of the State. This is the real key to the difference between Athenian progress and Spartan stagnation, and to the kind of development which took place later in Athenian education.

There are three main respects in which Athenian education contrasts itself with Spartan. In the first place the Spartans educated primarily for war, the Athenians rather for the arts of peace. In the second place the Athenians emphasized quite different aspects of the Greek ideal, and correspondingly modified the aim of education. In the third place Spartan education was public, Athenian private. That is to say, there was at Athens no state school system, as at Sparta, administered by state officials; but the schools were adventure schools, and the father as head of the family was held responsible for the education of his children.

With the Athenians the Homeric 'wise speech and brave action' was no longer an adequate expression of the ideal, though still expressing fundamental elements in it. They emphasized the excellence of man as man (*ἀρετή*), and included in their conception of this the idea of self-control or moderation (*σωφροσύνη*), inner harmony, as it were, together with becomingness or grace (*εὐκοσμία*), outer harmony of action and behaviour. Speaking in general terms, we may say that the Athenian practice and system of education were the result partly of this developed ideal of human excellence,

partly of the position of the State with respect to the rest of Greece, and partly of the democratic form of the government which gave public opinion an exceptional degree of influence. The aim of education throughout Greece was always to produce the good citizen, but at Athens the conception of what constituted good citizenship was so broad, the interests of the citizens were so many and so various, and their functions so important—increasingly so as time went on—that a narrow system of education, like that of Sparta, was out of the question.

Athens being a great commercial centre, it would naturally be supposed that, in their preparation of the young for citizenship, the Athenians would lay great stress on commercial, technical, and utilitarian elements or branches of education. This was very far indeed from being the case. In commercial Athens, as well as in agricultural Sparta, preparation for citizenship meant the development of body and mind, of character and taste, in a word culture, and the Athenian would never have dreamt of applying the term 'education' to the preparation for a commercial or industrial pursuit. That such training was to be had at Athens there can be no manner of doubt, but it formed no part, and was never considered as forming a part, of education.

As at Sparta, the period of home education at Athens extended normally over the first seven years of life, and during these years the mother was in the main responsible for the bringing up of the child, but at Athens wealthy families frequently employed nurses, and, as we have already seen, Lacedaemonian nurses were especially fashionable. [At this stage of education the care of the body was the chief consideration, but a beginning was also made with intellectual and moral education by means of tales of the Greek gods and heroes, children's games, and the like.] The age at which children began to go to school has been the subject of much dispute. In all probability it varied in individual cases.

Similarly the length of time children were kept at school varied according to the circumstances and social position of the parents. Normally the period of elementary education at Athens would probably extend from the end of the seventh to the end of the fifteenth or sixteenth year, and we may allow a year or so either way as a margin of safety.

When the Athenian boy began to go to school he was placed under the care of the 'paidagogos,' a trusted slave who had charge of the pupil on his way to and from school, and was particularly responsible for his conduct and behaviour—'a mixture,' as Freeman says, 'of nurse, footman, chaperon, and tutor.' The school subjects at Athens were three, 'grammata' or, as we should say 'letters' in a wide sense, music, and gymnastics. Originally 'grammata' and music proper were both included under 'music,' and Greek writers often use that word to cover all the elements of intellectual culture. Under 'grammata,' during the period of the Old Education at least, the subjects included were reading, writing, and the rudiments of arithmetic as the art of reckoning. In historical times the Athenian boy had three schools to attend—the school of the 'grammatistes' for letters, the school of the 'kitharistes' for music, and the school of the 'paidotribes'—the 'palaistra'—for gymnastics. It is not quite clear whether these schools were attended simultaneously or at different stages of education, but in all probability they were attended simultaneously for at least part of the whole school period.

The nature and scope of a boy's elementary education at Athens can be deduced from numerous passages in classical writers. Two such passages are so interesting that they may be quoted almost in full. The first is from Plato's *Protagoras* (translated by Wright):

The parents send the child to school 'with a strict charge to the master to pay far greater heed to the good behaviour of the children than to their progress in reading and music. And the master does make this his principal care, and as soon as

his boys have learned their letters, and are in a condition to understand what is written, as before what was spoken, he sets before them on their benches the works of good poets to read, and compels them to learn them by heart, choosing such poems as contain moral admonitions, and many a narrative interwoven with praise and panegyric on the worthies of old, in order that the boy may admire, and emulate, and strive to become such himself. And exactly on a similar principle the study of the music-master is to produce sobriety of character, and deter the young from the commission of evil ; and further, when he has taught them to play, he again instructs them in the works of other good poets, selecting lyric poems for their use, which he sets to his music, and compels the minds of his pupils to be familiarised with measure and harmony, to the end that their natures may be softened, and that, by becoming more sensible to time and tune, they may be better qualified to speak and to act. Nay more, they send them to gymnastic schools in order that by an increase of bodily strength they may be better able to serve their virtuous minds, and not be compelled by physical infirmity to shrink from their post in war and other emergencies.'

The second is from the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, and is strongly confirmatory of Plato's description, though, as praise of the good old times, inclined somewhat to exaggeration. The translation follows in the main Freeman :

' I will speak of the good old education, in the days when Justice still prevailed over Rhetoric, and morality was still fashionable. Then children were seen and not heard ; then the boys of each ward walked in orderly procession along the roads on their way to the school of the "kitharistes," without overcoats even in a blinding snowstorm. Then, when they stood up square—no lounging—the master taught them a fine old patriotic song like "Pallas, city-sacker dread," or "A cry that echoes afar," set to a good old-fashioned tune. If any one tried any vulgar trills and twiddles and odes where the metre

varies, like Phrunis and Co. nowadays, he got a tremendous thrashing for disrespect to the Muses. This was the education which produced the heroes of Marathon. This taught the boys to avoid the Agora, keep away from the baths, be ashamed at what is disgraceful, be courteous to elders, honour their parents, and be an impersonation of modesty instead of running after ballet-girls. They passed their days in the gymnasia, keeping their bodies in good condition, not mouth-ing quibbles in the Agora. Each spent his time with some well-mannered lad of his own age, running races in the Akademeia under the sacred olives, amid a fragrance of smilax and leisure and white poplar, rejoicing in the spring tide when plane tree and elm whisper together.'

The Athenian boy then read and learned by heart the older poets, especially Homer, he learned to play the seven-stringed lyre and to sing to its music the works of the lyric poets, and he practised wrestling, running, jumping, and the usual exercises of the gymnasium. The method was emphatically one of 'learning by doing,' and during the Old Education period little or no place was given to merely informational instruction. Further, great stress was laid on behaviour, conduct, etiquette, or on moral education generally through training. It is significant that this was the only matter concerning education in which the State interfered and for which the State provided by means of legislation. This fact throws some light on the emphasis it receives in the passages quoted. Lastly, professional skill was never aimed at, in fact was despised rather than admired in the best days. Again the *Protagoras*: 'But possibly you think that the instruction offered by Protagoras will not be given on this kind of principle, but will rather resemble what you received from your teachers in letters, music, and gymnastics. For you were instructed in each of these branches, not with a view to becoming a professional in it, but with a view of obtaining the education which is deemed fitting for the gentleman.'

amateur

It was even some disgrace rather than credit to be too good a penman.

All this refers only to the education of boys. The position of women at Athens was much inferior to their position at Sparta. At Athens the general tendency was to confine them to the house as much as possible, where they lived in almost Oriental seclusion, seeing and hearing little of the outside world. Xenophon suggests that the housewife may obtain exercise by walking about the establishment and supervising the work of the servants. A girl's education, therefore, was purely a home education in household duties, with the least possible contact with the outside world.

As already noted, the ordinary elementary education of the Athenian terminated about the age of fifteen or sixteen, probably earlier in the case of many. But the sons of the wealthier citizens spent the next two or three years in obtaining what we must call a secondary education, although in older times a secondary education confined to gymnastics. This took the form of more advanced physical exercises at the public gymnasia. This is of considerable importance in the history of Education as the germ from which a real secondary education, as we understand it, afterwards developed. A valuable, if somewhat informal, intellectual education was obtained by the youth at the public gymnasia, from association with adult citizens, and from listening to the social and political discussions which went on. As we shall see in the next chapter this education began to be systematised with the coming of the Sophists.

At the age of eighteen the Athenian youth came under the direct control of the State, as an 'ephebos' or cadet, and for the next two years he was required to devote his attention primarily to physical training, and to acquiring skill in the use of arms and in the performance of the various duties incident to a soldier's life. The first year he spent in camp life in the vicinity of the city, taking a prominent part in all processions and festivals; the second year he lived the life of a regular

soldier, doing garrison duty and policing the frontiers. At the age of twenty, after an examination, came graduation as a full Athenian citizen, and thenceforward the young man shared in that magnificent higher education which public life at Athens could yield.

CHAPTER II

THE NEW EDUCATION

THE key-note of the Old Education, in Sparta as in Athens, was always, as we have seen, Culture. It is true that social efficiency was assumed as the necessary outcome of the culture, and especially so at Sparta. Nay more, social efficiency might be said to have been the very core and centre of the culture. But the possibility of a contest between the claims of culture and social efficiency never presented itself to the minds of either Spartan or Athenian. It is during the New Education period that we find the consciousness of the possibility of such an opposition first arising. During the Old Education period the claims of utilitarianism in a narrower sense had never for a moment been admitted, in spite of the fact that the pre-suppositions underlying all Greek education were, after all, ultimately utilitarian in a wide sense. In the New Education period the claims of utilitarianism were forced into the foreground, and it was largely because of this that the opposition between culture and social efficiency arose, and that Greek educational theory itself became conscious.

We shall later return to a consideration of the interpretation of the principles underlying the educational practice of the Greeks by the great Greek educational theorists. In the meantime we must consider the changes which took place in that practice during this second period of educational history, and the kind of system which ultimately grew up in the Greek world.

THE TRANSITION PERIOD.

The changes in education which began to appear at Athens about the middle of the fifth century B.C. were partly the natural development of the older education, and partly also, perhaps mainly, the outcome of profound changes in social and economic conditions, which affected education directly, and also indirectly through the development of new influences predominantly literary and philosophical. An adequate discussion of these transitional influences would involve a detailed treatment of the history of Athens and of Greece during the fifth and fourth centuries. All that can be attempted in the present brief sketch is to indicate the kind of developments, which must necessarily and as a matter of course have taken place, and the main social and economic changes that actually took place with their bearing on education. NB

At a certain stage of civilization in every nation, no matter how practical, and the Greeks could hardly be said to have been practical, there is always a large and increasing class desirous of intellectual culture for its own sake, to say nothing of the increased influence which such culture might give them in the eyes of their fellows. For such a class there was at Athens, as well as at other Greek cities, what we might call the advanced study of art, music, literature, philosophy. But in the generation immediately succeeding the termination of the Persian Wars, art and music gradually became more and more professional and technical, and therefore ceased to be available. Philosophy and literature were left, but constructive philosophy had come to a temporary halt, all systems having apparently led to a scepticism from which there was no escape. At the same time, the profound social and economic changes, which we have mentioned, turned men's minds towards a practical use of the study of literature and of that logic, which the sceptical philosophy had developed.

A great development of democracy had taken place at

Athens during this period. The developed political life, which resulted, caused a premium to be placed on the ability to sway the minds of a popular audience, on forensic skill and oratorical ability. The enormous increase in the wealth of the State, owing to Athens becoming a great imperial power as well as a great commercial centre, offered a strong inducement to a political career, and a further premium on those accomplishments which made for success in such a career. Many of the leisured classes, therefore, whose interests would in the past have turned naturally to the higher forms of intellectual culture, were diverted into civic life.

These, and many other causes, also contributed to bring about radical changes in the whole outlook of the Athenians. Their wide commercial relations brought them into contact with foreign customs and foreign ideas. While this had a stimulating effect in many directions, the critical attitude towards their own customs and ideals, which was also developed, combined with the other causes mentioned, led ultimately to a decay in the old religion and morality, to a decline in the dignity and the moral and religious significance of the State itself, and to a general and widespread development of individualism. Practically all the factors at work tended towards this result, and philosophical scepticism was probably by no means the least powerful. The net result was the breaking down of the old religious basis of morality and the gradual crumbling away of the civic basis.

Athens being in this condition about the middle of the fifth century, there is nothing to surprise us in the fact that a new kind of teacher comes upon the scene, the Sophist, who professes to meet the new demand for a higher education, which should be in keeping with the spirit of the time. The intensity of this demand is shown by the success which attended the efforts of the new teachers to satisfy it. \ Primarily the Sophist was simply a teacher of higher subjects, a professor of what we should call secondary and higher education. He

supplemented the education given in the school of the 'grammatist' and that of the music teacher, by an education, which was professedly at one and the same time 'liberal' and a preparation for civic and practical life. The real secret of the influence of the Sophists, and the key to their significance in the history of Greek education, must be looked for in the fact that they focussed the various tendencies of the time and applied them to education, thus supplying the satisfaction of what was felt as the chief need of the time.

The treatment of the education of the Sophists must always present considerable difficulty to the educational historian on account of the variety of educational end, curriculum, and educational practice represented among them. Some, like Protagoras, aimed at civic virtue, some, like Socrates, at wisdom in the sense of true opinion, some, like Gorgias, at literary culture through the study of rhetoric and style, some, like Hippias, at general culture through an encyclopaedic course in the sciences and other branches of human knowledge; another group, equally various individually in their methods and practice, aimed at success in political or civic life; and still others aimed at the polish of the man of the world, the successful and brilliant society man. One result of this variety was the addition to education of many new subjects of instruction, such as mathematics, astronomy, grammar, geography, history, logic, ethics, prosody, and, most important of all, rhetoric. It was really a great service to education to make all these subjects available for the school, and, whatever their other defects may have been, the Sophists are at least entitled to the credit of this development.

During the Transition Period this new higher education might be characterised as fluid. It was of course purely voluntary. It was seldom continuous or systematic, since the Sophists usually wandered from city to city. It might be given in private houses and gardens, in the gymnasia or other places of public resort, in hired or borrowed school-rooms, or in the

street. Amid this fluid higher education, the system which characterised the Hellenistic period gradually began to take definite shape. Secondary and university education, as we understand them, came into existence. The period previous to the two years of training as an 'ephebos,' formerly devoted to gymnastic exercises and informal education in the public gymnasia, the ephebic period itself, and the years immediately succeeding its completion, were largely devoted to acquiring the new higher education offered by the Sophists. It is quite impossible to differentiate between secondary and university study at the outset, but before the Hellenistic period proper had set in, the two can be quite clearly distinguished. Very early, perhaps even during the Old Education period, some of the teachers of letters had begun to give instruction, beyond the ordinary elementary stage, to a few select boys, whose fathers wished to keep them a year or two longer at school. On the other hand, the definite rhetorical school of Isocrates and the still more definite philosophical school of Plato, which may be taken to represent university study, both belong, as far as historical date is concerned, to this period of transition.

The secondary education did not become very definite for a long time, but quite early we can distinguish two elements in the curriculum, one linguistic^a and literary, the other mathe^bmatical and scientific. Similarly in the higher or university education we can distinguish rhetoric and allied subjects from philosophy which included the most advanced scientific instruction. It is interesting to note that, as this new education developed and became more definite, and as the stages became more clearly differentiated from one another, the wandering and occasional teacher—the original Sophist—tended more and more to cease his attentions towards the elements of secondary education, and to profess either technical preparation for political, civic, and social life, or to give the elements of the more advanced university education. In other words the scope of his activity became continuously narrower, as the demand

which he tried to meet found its supply elsewhere in regular schools. It is interesting also to find that the higher schools soon came to require a preliminary secondary education on the part of those seeking admission. Both these developments are found before the Hellenistic period proper begins.

We may sum up very briefly the general changes which took place in education as a whole. In the first place its whole atmosphere was changed with the emphasizing of utilitarian ends. To persuade or please the multitude, to win a lawsuit, to confound an opponent in argument, to shine in society—none of these ends could yield a motive for real education. Consequently education tended to be showy and superficial, to strain after the novel and unusual, to be modern and up-to-date. This reacted both upon the subjects studied and upon the method. Linguistic study, chiefly in the form of Grammar and Rhetoric, assumed an exaggerated importance. Literature had always formed an important part of Athenian education. But in old days the content had been emphasized, the tendency now was to emphasize the form; in old days the great fathers of Greek literature, the older poets, had possessed a practical monopoly, now the later poetry and prose came to more than their own. The choice of words, grammar, style, logic, rhetoric, gradually came to occupy an altogether predominant position in higher education. Elementary education was also affected by the same spirit working downwards. Emphasis here too began to be laid on form rather than content, on instruction rather than training, on showy and superficial knowledge rather than practice. It was quite symptomatic that new and complicated musical instruments came to be the fashion, that there was a general relaxing in the severity of the gymnastic training, and that there was more or less neglect of moral training.

It must not be thought that the tendencies were all, from the educational standpoint, bad. We must always remember that a much wider outlook was at the same time given to

✓ education itself, that many new studies were added to the school curriculum, and wrought into shape for school use. But it remains true that this transition period raised the most fundamental and far-reaching educational problems in their most acute form. This also might be regarded as a service to education, from one point of view, since it supplied the stimulus to the great Greek educational thinkers.

THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD.

The development of higher education is the great characteristic of the Hellenistic period. Apart from those rhetorical schools which offered a purely technical or professional training, the Transition period ultimately gave birth to two types of higher school, either or both of which may be taken as representing university study, the school of Rhetoric and the school of Philosophy. Both types were combined in the Sophists, but they are clearly distinguishable in the following generation. And even among the Sophists there had been a tendency towards the formation of two groups, concerning themselves with culture rather than merely professional training, the one group emphasizing literary and linguistic study, the other aiming at something like encyclopaedism, with more than a tincture of philosophy.

The school of Isocrates has usually been taken as a type of the school of Rhetoric. This school has scarcely attracted the attention it deserves from the historian of Education. For more than half a century—Isocrates died at the advanced age of ninety-eight in 338 B.C.—it educated most of the leading men of action of the time. It did more perhaps than the philosophical schools of Plato and Aristotle to make Athens the intellectual centre of the Greek world, the first great university city. But it must also be recognized as the fountain-head of that education which became later the standard higher education of the Romans, the principles and practice of which

were in turn imbibed by the Renaissance humanists from the pages of Cicero and Quintilian, and transmitted thence in school practice right down to our own times in the work of our older universities and of the Public Schools of England and the Lycées of France.

Isocrates professed to teach his pupils Philosophy. He held that higher education must be practical, rational, and comprehensive. But by Philosophy he understood, not the Philosophy of Plato and the philosophers, but practical wisdom, the knowledge underlying the art of living a practical life. And the practical rational, and comprehensive education, being interpreted from the same point of view, reduced itself to the exercise of his pupils in the composing, criticising, and delivering of speeches, on all kinds of topics from rules and maxims which ought to guide the conduct of the individual to the principles which determine the government of nations. The most obvious criticism is of course, that, when the idea of form and style becomes supreme in education, as it did in the later rhetorical schools, if not in the school of Isocrates, the education is neither practical, rational, nor comprehensive. The school of Isocrates however professed to be, and was to some extent, a school of morality and practical wisdom, as well as a school of rhetoric. The course extended for three or four years. The fee was about £40. The product was the cultured gentleman, rather than the orator, the man of sound practical judgment, rather than the philosopher, the means by which this result was produced being the systematic study of language and literature. It is noteworthy that Isocrates, though he did not insist upon it, preferred that his students should have had a secondary education, as already described, in language and mathematics, before coming to him.

Alongside of the rhetorical schools were developed schools of a radically different type, the schools of philosophy. The origin of these we might also derive from the Sophists, but they sprang more especially and more directly from the work of

Socrates, and their aim differed from the aim of the rhetorical schools as his aim differed from the aim of the other Sophists. Socrates might therefore be called the founder of the first distinctively philosophical school. A school, however, like that of Socrates, lacking organization, and bound together by no bond save community of tastes and ideas, and common admiration of the master, could not be very definite or very permanent, and was thus far removed from the great organized Platonic, Aristotelian, Epicurean, and Stoic schools of a later date. It is therefore necessary for us to investigate the circumstances under which the great philosophical corporations were built up, for these were the real prototypes of the modern university.

What circumstances contributed to develop definiteness, organization, and permanence in the case of the great philosophical schools? The first was the acquisition of a definite and permanent place of meeting—a school building, as we should say—and along with this a distinctive name. These were first acquired by the Platonic school, which was established in close connection with the Academy, one of the public gymnasia, and became known as the school of the Academy. The relation of the philosophical schools to the gymnasia at Athens is very interesting, and is significant of the relation of the new higher education to the period formerly given over by the youth to gymnastic exercises. Antisthenes, the Cynic, taught in connection with the Kynosarges, and Aristotle with the Lyceum. Another important factor in giving definiteness to the schools, and in transforming into a regular school a changing body of students, was the changing of fees. Neither^β Socrates, Plato, nor perhaps Aristotle charged fees. Indeed they pointed the finger of scorn at the Sophists for what they called their scandalous behaviour in charging a fee for the spreading of the truth. But Speusippus, the successor of Plato at the Academy, and the heads of the various schools of that and succeeding generations, followed the precedent

of the Sophists rather than of the great founders of the schools.

Another circumstance gave continuity to the schools. The custom came to prevail for the head of a school to designate or at least recommend his successor. Thus Plato bequeathed to his nephew Speusippus his property near the Academy, his manuscripts, and the headship of the school. In time the election of the head came to be one of the privileges of the members of the inner circle, so to speak, the faculty, of the school, and in later times still the State made its influence felt in the election.

The last important factor in the development of the schools was the building up of endowments. These arose partly from the accumulation of fees, and partly from the donations and bequests of friends and former pupils of the schools. These sometimes took the form of simple contributions to the general funds. In other cases they were intended for special purposes, as, for example, the assistance of poor students. The endowments, naturally, contributed very materially to the influence as well as to the continuity of the schools.

A very large number of students seems to have been in attendance at some of the schools. We are told that Theophrastus, the successor of Aristotle, had at one time over 2000 students. In such a case there must have been a somewhat complex organization and a large staff of teachers. In addition we know that there were attached to each of the great schools extra-mural lecturers, as we should call them,—*privat-dozenten*—with numerous tutors and coaches, to prepare the students to enter the schools, for an entrance examination seems to have been demanded from the time of Plato, as well as to assist and direct them in their studies.

A further important factor, influencing the development of all the schools, rhetorical as well as philosophical, must not be forgotten. This was the modification of the ephebic training. After the Peloponnesian War, the period of ephebic

training, 'with the colours,' was reduced from two years to one, and after the Macedonian Conquest, it was made entirely voluntary. The admission of foreign students to the rank or degree of 'ephebos' was a later and still more radical change, as a consequence of which, after the establishment of Roman rule, the Roman element became as numerous as the native. From the ranks of the 'epheboi' the philosophical and rhetorical schools drew the majority of their students. The year of ephebic training became merely introductory to a prolonged period of study. The schools in consequence came to occupy a very important place in Athenian life, and the State gradually began to interest itself more and more directly in them. Financial support was given from the public funds, and at the same time the right of exercising some control over the various heads was claimed. At a later date the head of what we can now speak of as the University of Athens received the title of Sophist, and what we should call professorial chairs were established and endowed by various Roman emperors. As a matter of fact this University lasted till 529 A.D., when it was suppressed as a centre of pagan influence, in response to the demands of the leaders of the Christian Church. Long before this time, however, it had much declined in influence, and in the end was little more than a Neo-Platonic school, the rhetorical schools having long disappeared.

What is characteristically Hellenistic culture may be said to have developed after the Macedonian Conquest and the eastern expedition of Alexander the Great, and to have been in a great measure due to these events. In any case, with the Hellenizing of the East, Greek culture and civilization itself ceased to be Hellenic and became cosmopolitan. One important result of this was its reaction upon the philosophical schools. As civic bonds gradually weakened with the development of individualism, and as Greek education became less and less national and more and more cosmopolitan, membership in these schools came to take the place occupied in the life of previous

generations by the duties of active citizenship, and the schools themselves came to be powerful self-governing societies, with their own laws, ritual, ceremonies, privileges, etc. This development had been foreshadowed in Pythagoreanism, but that early school had been suppressed because of its anti-civic tendencies. Things were now changed, and the life of culture, the contemplative life, claimed more and more the loyalty and adherence of the best minds among the Greeks, as the State became less and less able, and less and less inclined to advance a counter-claim. This was, in fact, as we shall see, the natural development of the political and philosophical teaching of both Plato and Aristotle, though it was one of the tendencies which they both strove to counteract.

The same causes led to the work in the rhetorical schools becoming more and more formal, and less and less in touch with real life. For them too the aim came to be a culture quite divorced from practical life, a culture so narrow that the education given was necessarily artificial in the highest degree. With the Romans it became for a space less artificial, but with the Romans too the ultimate result was the same. The philosophical schools were, however, not in a position to point the finger of scorn at the formalism of the rhetorical schools, for they also soon developed a formalism of a different kind. The ideas of their founders were simply expounded with little or no attempt at criticism or progress. Subtleties of thought and meaning came to occupy in them an analogous position to subtleties of language and expression in the rhetorical schools.

One other result of the Hellenizing of the East must be mentioned. After Alexander's conquests a number of centres of learning arose in different parts of his empire, which might well be called universities. Of these the most interesting and important was the University of Alexandria. This owed its foundation to the first of the Ptolemies, Ptolemy Soter. On the break-up of Alexander's empire, Ptolemy seized and held

Egypt, assuming in 306 B.C. the title of king. Ptolemy pursued what was in many respects a most enlightened policy, and part of this policy culminated in the establishment of the famous Museum of Alexandria, and of the still more famous Library. The Museum was intended as a home for research rather than as a teaching institution, but to some extent it performed both functions. There scholars and philosophers resided at the royal expense and pursued their investigations. The Alexandrian University was not at first conspicuous for its development of philosophy, but in science considerable progress was made. The most successful work was done in Astronomy, Geography, and Mathematics. With this kind of work the two most famous names associated are the names of Euclid and Archimedes. In grammar and literary criticism also we owe a good deal to the work of Alexandrian scholars.

It was this Hellenistic education with which the Romans came into contact, and it was the developed higher curriculum of Hellenistic culture, which, as the Seven Liberal Arts, overleapt the Middle Ages, and was wrought into the texture of the higher education of Modern Europe. It is indeed very difficult to point to any element in the education of Modern Europe, apart from those due directly to the influence of Christianity, which is not to be found, in germ at least, in the education of the Greeks.

The truth of this statement as regards secondary and higher education is, after what has been said, fairly obvious. But how is it with respect to primary or elementary education? With respect to primary education it is scarcely true to the same extent, for the elementary education of the modern world was in a certain sense unknown in ancient times. Nevertheless the fundamental elements of early education are present in the education of the Old Education period, and such developments as took place during Hellenistic times were more or less in the direction of the State elementary school and its practice of the modern world.

Of this primary or elementary education during Hellenistic times we have so far had nothing to say. Arguing on general grounds, we might expect to find in this sphere developments analogous to those in higher education. Our materials, however, for a detailed reconstruction of primary education during Hellenistic times are somewhat scanty. Nevertheless recent researches and recent excavations on the sites of various ancient cities of the Hellenistic world, Miletus, Pergamum, and others, have yielded some interesting, if somewhat fragmentary, indications of the nature of elementary education in Hellenistic times, considerably extending the knowledge hitherto possessed, and to some extent confirming the results of speculation on the analogy of the changes in higher education.

In the first place education became 'institutionalized,' if we may use the term. As in the case of higher education, endowments and endowed institutions for elementary education also sprang up in various centres, due in the main to the benevolent or self-interested munificence of kings and princes, but sometimes to the efforts of private individuals and the subscriptions of wealthy citizens. Further the development of State school systems was also a characteristic of this period. In Sparta, in Crete, and in many other parts of Greece, we have such systems from early times. It is just possible that even the Athenian education was more of a State system during the Old Education period, than is generally supposed. It is practically certain that in Hellenistic times organized State systems and State schools—reckoning the city as the State—were to be found everywhere, even in Athens itself.

In the second place, as we saw in dealing with the transition period, changes in the kind of work done, of the same general nature as those in higher education, took place also in primary education. The tendencies during the transition period were on the one hand towards linguistic study, on the other hand towards accomplishments. It is not surprising therefore to find in the primary school what can only be

considered as the beginnings of rhetorical studies, such beginnings as Quintilian later recommends, in exercises which were introductory to the exercises of the rhetorical schools themselves. Similarly accomplishments became an aim, for example, in the case of penmanship, quite contrary to the spirit of the Old Education, while in physical and musical education the old aims were more or less lost sight of in a straining after show and effect. Such tendencies were encouraged by the public contests which took place. These were of course a characteristic of Greek life from very early times. But in Hellenistic times their scope was much extended, so that we have not merely athletic contests, and music contests, but contests in 'grammata.' This was an examination system in about the worst form that an examination system could take, and its results do not require to be dwelt upon.

Finally, as regards the school curriculum, internal organisation and school practice, the life of the school generally, several very interesting developments took place. The three great branches of education, gymnastics, music, and 'grammata,' still continued, though not without modifications, and more especially progress in the methods of instruction. In music flute-playing was added comparatively early to lyre-playing and singing. As regards 'grammata' we have fairly full information as to the nature and method of the work in reading, writing, dictation, and the like, a detailed description of which scarcely comes within the scope of the present work¹. Our knowledge of the other subjects coming under the head of 'grammata' is rather scanty and fragmentary. Geometry, drawing, and geography, however, seem to have been added to the curriculum, and the teaching of the first in connection with models, and the last by means of maps, and later globes, appears to have been practised. Registers of pupils, honours lists, pupils' exercise books, and many other relics of the schools of the Greek world have been discovered and are now

¹ See Ziebarth, *Aus dem griechischen Schulwesen*.

preserved in various museums, and these throw considerable light on the internal organization of the schools, and the nature of the work done. Interesting side-lights on the life of the school are thrown by the records of the numerous societies and clubs among the pupils, by the indications here and there of co-education of the sexes, by the annual selection in several cities of the teachers. These things can only be mentioned here, but any historian of the schools of Greece, working, say, on the lines of Freeman's *Schools of Hellas*, would find a great number of extremely interesting facts to record of the primary as well as the higher schools of Hellenistic times.

PART II

GREEK EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT

INTRODUCTION

\ EDUCATIONAL thought is in the main a rendering explicit of the principles which underlie educational practice. This is especially true as regards Greek educational thought. The explicit development of Greek educational theory was one of the leading characteristics of the period of the New Education. The reason is not far to seek. As we have already seen the education given by the Sophists—or, more accurately, the deeper tendencies which they attempted to embody and interpret in their educational practice—raised fundamental educational problems in an acute form.

At the same time we must regard the rise of Greek educational theory as partly a natural phase in the development of Greek philosophy. Philosophy has been described as ‘a thinking view of things.’ This means that philosophy arises when men cease to be content with the mere facts of existence, and seek to find reasons for these facts, to give some rational explanation of why the facts are so and not otherwise, or, briefly, to solve the riddle which the universe must always

present to the thinking mind. We naturally find in the first stage or phase of philosophical thought that thinkers are pre-occupied with the facts of the external world, so that philosophy and science have thus a common origin. It is only later that they direct their enquiries to the nature of man, later still that they think about thought itself and the principles underlying human conduct. For the student or historian of philosophy, Greek philosophy affords an admirable illustration of the mode in which these phases develop. Our interests for the present, however, are educational rather than philosophical, and it is evidently only the last phase of philosophical development that has a direct bearing upon educational thought. Nevertheless, in order to see clearly how this phase developed in Greek philosophy, it is advisable, even for the sake of the educational student, that we should consider briefly the earlier philosophies. For it was the failure of these earlier philosophies to satisfy, that led to the turning of men's thoughts to problems of human conduct, that is to ethical philosophy, which underlies and naturally leads on to the philosophy of education.

The earliest Greek philosophical thought was almost entirely ontological. That is to say the philosophical thinkers boldly attacked the problems of existence itself, of what really exists and what only appears to exist, and of how what exists came into being, without any hesitation, doubt, or preliminary enquiry as to the ability of the finite human mind to grapple with and solve these ultimate problems. Thus in the Greek colonies in Asia Minor, and probably under oriental influences, philosophy took its rise in an attempt to explain the origin, nature, and constitution of the universe.

The early Ionic philosophers, Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, attempted to derive everything from one original substance. The first suggested that water, or something of the nature of water, the second that a substance which he called 'the indefinite' (*ἄπειρον*), and the last that air was this

original substance. They all attempted to explain the way in which the things that constitute the universe, as we experience it, came into being, by assuming processes of separating out, condensation, and rarefaction within the original substance. But the dilemma resulted—if the original substance had definite qualities, how can we explain the derivation from it of substances having the opposite qualities, and if it had no definite qualities, what explanation can we offer of qualitatively different substances coming into existence at all. This dilemma clearly involves the failure of these early philosophers to solve the problems of existence, and also indicates that the solution must be sought in a different direction.

This first serious difficulty, which philosophy has encountered, will apparently disappear, if we regard the things we see, the universe as it actually presents itself to us, as a mere appearance, significant of some deeper reality, but not itself real in any ultimate sense. The next two schools of philosophy adopted this line of thought, maintaining that the reality underlying the universe, the essence of the universe, so to speak, was something abstract, not the concrete things we actually see and touch.

The mathematical school of Pythagoras maintained that the essence of things was quantity or number. It is not difficult to see how the Pythagoreans might arrive at such a conclusion. The early philosophers had explained the variety we find in the world as due in some way to condensation and rarefaction. Hence it could be argued that, if you can reduce the variety of the world to differences of more or less, then the true reality of the world, the essence of things, is quantity or number. But, though it is easy to see how the position of the Pythagoreans might be arrived at, the meaning of their doctrine that numbers are things, that the system of numbers coincides with the world, is very obscure. They certainly, however, mean and probably in the beginning this was their main contention, that it was not the material substance, of

which things were composed, that really mattered, but their mathematical framework, the way in which things were ordered in space, as regards size, weight, and position.

We have mentioned the Pythagoreans mainly for the sake of completeness. Our interest is rather with the second school of thought, the Eleatics, as they were called, as more significant for the development of philosophy in the direct line. This school denied altogether the real existence of the variety we apparently find in the world, and also of the apparent changes which we see going on around us. They held that the things we see, touch, and feel, do not really exist at all, that the only real existence is the One, devoid of all multiplicity, Being, without change, or what may be called Becoming. Motion, variety, change were to them mere semblance. This general point of view has been poetically expressed by Shelley in the *Adonais* in the lines:—

‘The One remains, the Many change and pass;
Heaven’s light for ever shines, Earth’s shadows fly;
Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of Eternity.’

Parmenides was the chief constructive mind of this school. But almost equally important in the history of thought is his pupil Zeno, who developed a logic in defence of Eleaticism, which proved quite as formidable, when applied destructively to the Eleatic positions themselves.

Eleaticism really represents a critical point in the development of philosophical thought. It was on the part of the Eleatics, little more than a pure assumption, to say that variety and change were not real but merely apparent, at least without attempting to establish criteria by means of which we may distinguish between reality and appearance. It might with equal force be urged, as against them, that change and Becoming were the only realities, permanence and Being simply semblance, that in the universe everything is motion, and change, and perpetual flux. This was the position taken up

by Heraclitus, the next of the philosophical succession. The Eleatics had denied the real existence of Nature. Heraclitus asserted it, but at the same time maintained that the world was in perpetual flux, and, returning once more to the point of view of the earlier philosophers, that fire was its essence.

This direct antithesis between the Eleatics and Heraclitus could hardly fail to develop a sceptical attitude as regards the possibility of ultimate knowledge or philosophy. Here were two philosophical schools, apparently with equal reason, asserting contrary propositions about the same thing. A natural inference was the likelihood of its being impossible to say what was ultimately real and what mere appearance. When Empedocles and Democritus followed with their assertions that both change and permanence, both Becoming and Being, both the Many and the One were real, the confusion was worse confounded, and the tendency towards a sceptical outcome accentuated.

The Eleatics, moreover, had asserted, and Heraclitus had emphasized, an important distinction between Opinion and Knowledge, in terms of which this scepticism might find expression. In their insistence on the unreality of the things we see, the former were compelled to hold that sense-perception was quite untrustworthy as far as giving us real Knowledge was concerned. The kind of information we get from the senses they called Opinion. Physical science, therefore, was merely a doctrine of opinions. On the other hand, by thinking, that is by philosophy, we arrived at the only true Knowledge, knowledge of the permanent underlying reality. On this Knowledge, we have seen, the confusion in philosophy cast grave doubts. Heraclitus was even more emphatic in his assertion of the uncertainty of the knowledge derived from the senses. And his own principles compelled him to go a step farther than the Eleatics with respect to Knowledge, properly so called. Since everything is in perpetual flux, Knowledge itself is evidently an impossibility, except the

knowledge that there is perpetual flux. A combination of the results of philosophy so far will yield nothing more than the statement that ultimate Knowledge is either impossible, or a matter of opinion, and the knowledge we derive from the senses certainly untrustworthy, and, therefore, also a matter of opinion.

Had it not been for the introduction of a new principle of explanation, the credit for which must be assigned to Anaxagoras, philosophical speculation as to the ultimate reality of the world could have made no progress beyond this point. Aristotle characterizes Anaxagoras as the first of the philosophers who was 'truly awake,' the earlier philosophers being mere dreamers. With Anaxagoras Greek philosophy proper begins. The earlier systems of thought were undoubtedly considerably influenced by the philosophico-religious thought of Egypt and the East, and were more or less non-Hellenic. On the one hand the philosophy of Anaxagoras was quite in line with these earlier systems of thought, and merely added to the existing confusion as to what was real and what mere appearance, and to the existing doubts as to the possibility of any ultimate knowledge. On the other hand, however, by making Reason (*νοῦς*) the supreme principle of the universe, and the principle with reference to which the universe must be explained, he rendered possible a new advance and justified Aristotle's estimate of him.

The earlier philosophers, in trying to explain how the world had actually come into being, had talked of condensation and rarefaction, friendship and strife, hate and love, as the forces at work. Anaxagoras asserted that Reason had entered a chaotic universe, if the expression is permissible, and ordered everything with reference to ends or purposes. Everything was at the start a 'heterogeneous homogeneity'; Reason intervened and reduced the chaos to order.

Ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν· εἶτα νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε.

He insisted therefore that we must explain the ordering of the

universe, not by blind forces, but by an intelligence seeking to realize its purposes. In philosophical language, he demanded and offered a teleological account of the universe. It does not appreciably diminish the credit due to Anaxagoras for first proclaiming this principle, to say that he himself was often content when he had assigned reasons in place of purposes.

In emphasizing Reason Anaxagoras emphasized an element in the problem, which was capable, as subsequent philosophy showed, of further expansion, and which might be said, not only to offer a new topic for philosophy, but to open up a new line of advance and afford a new basis for speculation as to what was ultimately real. This advance, however, was not yet. The confusion of contending theories, the opposition between Knowledge and Opinion, the denial by some of the possibility of Knowledge at all, and the general agreement that the senses were utterly untrustworthy, made it not unreasonable, as we have seen, to hold that the only guide and criterion after all was individual opinion. The Reason of Anaxagoras could also be interpreted as Reason in the individual man, guided by the opinions, and seeking to realise the purposes of the individual man. The total outcome of Greek philosophy up to this point might therefore be said to be that general attitude towards knowledge which we might call either sceptical subjectivism or subjectivistic scepticism.

The student of Education is, at this stage, likely, and perhaps he is entitled, to ask—What has all this to do with educational thought? The answer has been already indicated, and is, that the rise of Greek educational theory was largely due to the position of affairs which had developed in philosophy. Ethics, the philosophy of human conduct, had hitherto been almost entirely neglected. The defeat of intellectual enquiry in its search after the ultimate principles of existence and reality, stimulated and afforded opportunity for the development of ethical philosophy. The *voûs* of Anaxagoras, together with his principle of teleological explanation, seemed in this

sphere, at all events, specially applicable, and indicative of some possibility of progress. But Ethics and Politics were to the Greek a single department of philosophical thought, and Politics, at least, if not Ethics, involved, as an essential element, a study of the principles underlying education. The new direction of philosophy, therefore, could not help developing into a systematic examination of educational presuppositions, and a reasoned educational theory.

CHAPTER I

THE SOPHISTS AND SOCRATES

THE history of educational thought may be said to begin with the Sophists. There is, of course, an educational theory implicit in all educational practice, but it is only when such a theory becomes explicit that we have educational thought properly so called. The Sophists, then, were the first to attempt to make explicit the theory underlying Greek education. Not that they were in any strict sense educational theorists; they find their place in educational history primarily as practical teachers, and their theory was merely secondary and incidental. But just as in their educational practice the Sophists summed up or represented the tendencies in contemporary Greek life, so they summed up the tendencies in Greek philosophy in an educational theory.

Where they philosophize at all, the Sophists take up the position of a sceptical subjectivism. Ultimate knowledge has been shown to be impossible, and we are thus thrown back upon, and restricted to, individual sense-perception, however unreliable that may be in the view of philosophy. The individual man 'is the measure of all things.' What is true for the individual is true; what is good for the individual is good. Otherwise there can be neither truth nor goodness. Anaxagoras holds that the universe must be explained and interpreted teleologically. But there is a radical ambiguity

involved in this position. For the end may either be immanent in the universe, or it may be an end imposed on the universe from without. The same ambiguity meets us in the notion of Reason. From their ultimate position, or rather their denial of the possibility of any ultimate position, the Sophists were practically bound to understand by Reason subjective cleverness, the Reason we meet in the man who is seeking to realise his own ends, and to hold that the world exists for our use, not in order to realise an immanent purpose. Their aphorism that the 'clever are masters of everything' was, therefore, a definite, if one-sided, interpretation of Anaxagoras's ambiguous supremacy of Reason.

Carrying over this line of thought into educational theory, the Sophists quite naturally maintained, that the 'excellence' (*ἀρετή*), at which all real education confessedly aimed, was, in the first place 'civic excellence,' and this meant, in the second place, the kind of excellence that brings success in life, the 'clever' management of one's property and civic affairs. A frank utilitarianism was thus the inevitable outcome of the philosophy which the Sophists inherited, when interpreted in their way. Once admit their fundamental assumptions, and there is no escape from their conclusion. It is a moot point whether such fundamental assumptions do not always underlie a narrow utilitarianism in educational theory.

As soon as we appreciate the frankly and narrowly utilitarian conception of education which the Sophists held, it becomes an easy matter to understand their educational practice. Pure utility for the individual was their guiding principle. While professing to teach men to think, speak, and act rationally, they interpreted 'rationally' to mean successfully from the individual and personal point of view. They therefore undertook to furnish young men with the kind of education that would enable them to get on in the world, which they called the teaching of wisdom and virtue. The content of such education was naturally, in view of the prevailing condition

of affairs in Athens, language, rhetoric, logic, together with a superficial philosophy of life. The method varied, but in most cases the formal lecture was prominent. Learning by heart became—in a way it had not been before—and remained for about two thousand years, a very important part of the process of education.

The position which the Sophists took up with regard to moral education is of very great interest historically. They raised the questions whether and how 'virtue,' that is civic virtue, morality, can be taught. They could not, from their fundamental philosophy, have any ethical system, properly so called, and, if pressed, they were bound to admit that what was good for the individual was good. But nevertheless they accepted generally the conventional morality, and attempted to give a quasi-philosophical explanation of that, pointing out the prudential character of all moral conduct, and maintaining therefore a kind of superficial and unsystematic hedonism. Quite consistently from their point of view, they hold that morality can be taught, and by what we should call the direct and systematic method. This implies the identification of Virtue with Knowledge, and superficially it is the same thought which became afterwards the keynote of much of the teaching with regard to moral education of both Socrates and Plato.

SOCRATES (c. 470–399 B.C.).

Socrates may be said to have been the greatest of the Sophists. But to regard Socrates as a sophist, though this was certainly how he was regarded by his contemporaries, is apt to be a little misleading. While in many respects he resembled the Sophists, in many respects he radically differed from them. As we have seen, they were primarily teachers; Socrates also might be regarded as a teacher, but the term 'educator' better describes the kind of work he did or tried to do. The Sophists found a demand for a certain kind of

instruction, and, while trying, on the one hand, to furnish the supply to meet the demand, they, on the other hand, pursued teaching as a lucrative profession. They concerned themselves with problems of conduct and virtue, because such questions cropped up in the direct line of their professional activity. The attitude of Socrates was quite different. He pursued a practice very similar to that of the Sophists, not for the sake of the material reward, but because he had the deepest kind of conviction, sometimes to a hallucinatory degree, that it was his divinely appointed task to teach men, that he was 'called' to be an educator.

Again, like the Sophists, Socrates rejected the conclusions of speculative philosophy, except in so far as these led to scepticism with regard to ultimate knowledge. Like the Sophists, too, he directed his attention towards practical life and conduct. But the scepticism of Socrates was much more thorough and consistent than that of the Sophists, and his analysis of the presuppositions underlying practical life and conduct had quite other aims. Starting from a thorough-going subjectivistic scepticism, Socrates not only drew the inference that ultimate knowledge was unattainable, but also that no one had any right or any authority to dogmatically overbear the opinions of another, and indeed that no one had the power to instruct another in something the other did not know. All opinions were equally true. This position seems to preclude the possibility of advance. Socrates, however, maintained further that some opinions were more useful as working hypotheses than others. Accordingly some opinions were better than others as regards the conduct which was based on opinion. His ultimate criterion was hedonistic, and he made it his business to bring others towards a true perception of their interest, and thus lead them to substitute a better opinion for a worse. It is difficult to see how Socrates could be consistent with himself at this point, but the difficulty is, no doubt, due partly to the fact that we do not know very

definitely what Socrates's exact positions were, and must merely infer or speculate as to many of them, and partly because the teaching of Socrates was not, and was not intended to be, a systematic ethical philosophy¹.

The main positive ethical doctrine that Socrates lays down is that Virtue is Knowledge. We have already seen that this was implied in the position taken up by the Sophists with respect to moral education. But with Socrates this principle becomes explicit. His line of argument is, that every one seeks to attain his own good, and of all goods Virtue is the best; hence no man, knowing good, can seek the bad; when a man does evil, it is because of ignorance, because of lack of insight into what was his truest interest. What we call by different names, as the several virtues, must be regarded as merely different forms of wisdom, manifested in different spheres of activity. To be pious is to have a knowledge of what is due to the gods, to possess courage is simply to have a true insight into what is to be feared and what is not to be feared, and so on. Virtue is then to be identified with insight, knowledge of the end and of the means for attaining the end, a knowledge, which cannot help realizing itself in action. This knowledge or insight is obviously what we should call practical wisdom. In this sphere, as in the sphere of speculative philosophy, Socrates made no pretence of being able to attain ultimate knowledge, or rather maintained that its attainment was impossible. Nevertheless he occasionally appeals to human nature in a way that implies the presence in human nature of some ultimate criterion, which cannot be explained, but must simply be accepted.

These general principles of the Socratic thought afford us considerable help and guidance in unravelling the educational theory, both as to aim and as to method, which underlay his practice. [The aim of education, he held, was ultimately right

¹ Some authorities read much more of the Platonic teaching into the teaching of Socrates. See, for example, Erdmann's *History of Philosophy*.

conduct, not success in life.] Socrates accepts the teleological principle of the Sophists, accepts even their utilitarianism, but at the same time answers that utilitarianism by transcending their point of view. He maintains that we must pass beyond the immediate utility to an ultimate utility, and draws a distinction between that which is an end for particular individuals, and that which is an end universally. The educational implication of this position, which it was really left for Plato to work out, is that [we cannot rest our education on the determination of what is merely a finite end, but only on the determination of what is an end in itself, for the finite end is only an end in so far as it subserves a higher end, and it therefore necessarily leads beyond itself.]

The proximate end of education, according to the Socratic practice, is to substitute right opinion for wrong. In seeking to attain this end, Socrates developed a new method in education, the Socratic method. We must remember that Socrates held that instruction in the ordinary sense was impossible. All that could be done by the teacher, all that the teacher had any right to attempt, was to eradicate wrong opinion by leading the individual himself to see its inadequacy, and then to lead the individual himself to substitute right opinion. The process by means of which this was accomplished was his favourite 'dialectical' or conversational method. The method has really two stages. At first the individual, who is being educated, is not merely ignorant, but mistakes his ignorance for knowledge, and it is therefore necessary, in the first place, to convince him of his own ignorance. The first stage of the method is therefore destructive. Taking as his starting-point some proposition to which his companion at once assents, Socrates gradually leads up to a legitimate inference from this proposition, which is obviously inconsistent with the opinion he is attacking. The aim of this stage of the process is simply to make an individual conscious of his own ignorance, to reduce him to a state of 'perplexity' (*ἀπορία*),

as the necessary preliminary to the constructive stage, by means of which he is brought either to formulate for himself a rule of conduct, or to frame a definition, which has ultimately a direct bearing on conduct. It is hardly necessary to point out how much sound educational theory is involved in this method. It is analytico-synthetic, starting from the known, and leading up to a generalization, either expressed or implied, and from that to its application. By its destructive stage it develops the need which can only be satisfied by further enquiry. And through its procedure by question and answer, it secures the co-operating activity of the 'pupil' throughout.

The content and meaning of education for Socrates also follow from his fundamental principles. No one can say he has taught unless some one has learned. But learning with Socrates does not mean the acquiring of knowledge, but a process which might almost be better described as 'recollection.' It means reaching a true self-knowledge, which involves at the same time a perfect self-control. The content of such education, if we may use that expression at all, was entirely moral. In other words, Socrates confined his efforts to moral education. This at least is the Socrates we find in the Dialogues of Plato, and in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. And, in spite of the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, where Socrates is represented as sitting in a suspended basket, star-gazing, and his pupils as concerning themselves with various branches of physical and natural science, we may assume that the historical Socrates is the Socrates of Plato and Xenophon.

Superficially regarded, Socrates does not seem to have added much to the theory of moral education, as we find that expressed by the Sophists. But when we look closer we find he has added a great deal. In the first place moral education was given a new aim and a new meaning. In the second place, while assenting to the proposition of the Sophists that Virtue could be taught, Socrates implied that it could only be taught by the Socratic method. If we were to put the doctrine of Socrates as regards

moral education into modern language, and interpret it in the light of our controversy between the advocates of direct and indirect moral instruction, we should say, that Socrates held that a good disposition does not secure Virtue, nor does training and discipline. The best the latter can do is to form good habits and establish a morality based on custom. The only morality that is worth while, that can be truly called Virtue, is a morality which is conscious of the grounds of its actions, and is able to teach them or explain them to other people. The only thing that ought to determine what is good and right for a man to do is his own insight or knowledge. Hence enlightenment as to a man's truest interest is the only road to Virtue, and the opposite of Virtue is ignorance. ✓

The difficulties which this theory of moral education entailed only became apparent, when Socrates tried to express it, and still more when his professed followers tried to express it after his death. Such was his strength of will, or his genius for Virtue, that in his own experience Socrates apparently did not know moral, but only intellectual, conflicts, and he read his own experience into other people. To him knowledge of the Good meant doing what was right; insight, self-knowledge, and Virtue were one, but only because he was Socrates. For him there was complete harmony between the inner self and its external relations. But when his disciples attempted to develop in theory what Socrates had *lived*, the difficulties in the position were very soon revealed.

We might almost say that the personality and life of Socrates have as much significance for the history of Education as his specific teaching. For these and, above all perhaps, his fate at the hands of the Athenian democracy, exerted a powerful influence on both Xenophon and Plato, in addition to his educational thought itself, in shaping their ideas with regard to both government and education.

CHAPTER II

XENOPHON AND PLATO

Two of the three chief Greek writers on Education, Xenophon and Plato, were actual and professed disciples of Socrates. Each developed an aspect of the Socratic educational theory, the aspect that appealed to him. For this reason we may discuss the two together in the present chapter. There is a further reason. Both were social reformers, who saw in education the only means towards social reform, and therefore both may be said to approach educational problems from the same general point of view, very general, it must be admitted.

XENOPHON (445-354 B.C.).

According to Jebb, Xenophon is better known to us as a man than almost any Greek author. He was born at Athens, of a good family, probably some years later than 445 B.C., the date generally assigned for his birth. Having received a good education at the expense of his brother Gryllus, he attached himself as a disciple to Socrates. He remained on terms of the closest intimacy with that great teacher, until he left Athens in 401 B.C., to take part in that expedition of Cyrus against the Persian king, of which he has left us record in his *Anabasis*. Two years later Socrates was put to death by the Athenian democracy, and so far as we know, Xenophon never returned to Athens, nor apparently had much desire to return. Some

five years later, a decree of exile was passed against him for assisting the Spartans and their allies, while these were the enemies of Athens. Accordingly he settled at Scillus, in Elis, near Olympia, under Spartan protection. After the disastrous defeat of the Spartans at Leuktra in 371 B.C., Xenophon was driven from his new home, and he then settled in Corinth, where he died about 354 B.C., his sentence of banishment from Athens having been repealed about ten years before his death.

Xenophon seized upon that aspect of the Socratic teaching, which he understood, and which appealed to him, viz. that the great thing was to get men to live well, by getting them to see clearly what was right and what was wrong, and that all other things were of minor importance, and might even be obstacles to the realizing of the true life. Unlike Plato, Xenophon was no philosopher, and although he writes on educational theory and practice, he does not write as a philosopher, nor even as a practical teacher—for he was neither—but purely as a social reformer. He finds in education the key to the social problems and the cure for the social evils of the time. We have, therefore, in Xenophon's educational theories, the views of a disciple of Socrates, a man of wide and varied experience of the world, of undoubted practical, but little philosophical, ability, of high moral character, and marked by keen observation of men and things, on the possible reform of social conditions by means of a reform in education.

Xenophon was an Athenian gentleman of the old school, somewhat puritanical, and with an intense dislike of the extreme form of Athenian democracy, a dislike which was strengthened by the fate which had befallen the greatest of Greek moral teachers in Athens. He was excessively fond of things Spartan, especially enamoured, again partly in the way of reaction, of Spartan education, so much so that he had his own children brought up at Sparta. Further he loved an outdoor life in the country, had won considerable reputation as a soldier, and did

not really understand city and civic life. These characteristics of the man explain a good many of the characteristics of the system of education which he advocates.

The educational ideas of Xenophon are developed mainly in his *Cyropaedia* or 'Education of Cyrus.' This has often been erroneously regarded as a history. It is really a pedagogical romance, of the earliest, if not the earliest, of that series, which includes the *New Atlantis* of Bacon, the *Emile* of Rousseau, and the *Leonard and Gertrude* of Pestalozzi. The scene is laid in Persia, but the system of education sketched is, in essentials, that of Sparta. Athens and Sparta were on terms of hostility when Xenophon wrote, and it has been conjectured, with a high degree of probability, that Xenophon therefore chose to put his educational teaching in this form, as more likely to commend itself to the Athenians, than if he had directly recommended the adoption of some of the practices of the hated Spartans.

However that may be, the system of education sketched may be described as in the main moral and military. The intellectual element is wholly eliminated. 'When boys go to school,' he says, 'they spend the time in learning justice. They say they go for that purpose, just as our boys go to learn letters.' Thus strongly does Xenophon react against the intellectual tendencies of the Sophists, and emphasize the predominant aim of the Socratic teaching.

The main features of Xenophon's system really follow from this attitude which he has taken up. The education is purely political and civic, in the sense that men are regarded solely from the civic point of view. While the government of the State is in theory democratic, it becomes in practice aristocratic, for the poorer classes are virtually excluded by their poverty from sharing in the education, which is the road to all honours, distinction, and advancement in the State, since social distinctions are based upon merit, that is, education and conduct. The laws with regard to education are

to be so framed, and the education itself is to be of such a nature, as to render unnecessary prohibitions of the form 'Thou shalt not steal,' by providing beforehand that the citizens shall never have the disposition to do any such things. Though this may appear an entirely unrealizable dream, it nevertheless involves the sound and important principle, that a moral education which is mainly pathological is but a poor kind of moral education. The military aspect of the system is emphasized when Xenophon comes to deal with physical education. He proposes that hunting should be made a matter of public concern, and pursued systematically, as an important part of education. Considerable emphasis is naturally laid on physical development, and the recommendations are distinctly Spartan. Finally Xenophon advocates the adoption of several features characteristic of the education of Sparta, such as, common meals, monitorial teaching, and the like.

Xenophon apparently makes no provision for the education of the girls in his ideal State. But he by no means ignores the very important question of the education of women. The truth is, he regards it as distinctly another kind of problem altogether from the education of the men, the citizens. His *Œconomics* is largely a discussion of the function and education of woman. Here we see that Xenophon considers the range of woman's activities as confined to the family, and in this respect he is Athenian rather than Spartan. The education of woman will correspond to her function, and will be an education for the duties of the household and the family. (*specific*)

Speaking in general terms, we may sum up Xenophon's whole educational theory by saying that he merges the man in the citizen, the woman in the housewife, and advocates for each the training and education demanded by their respective duties. His attitude is old-fashioned, but yet essentially Socratic, in that he maintains the absolute supremacy of the idea of conduct in all education.

Xenophon's educational theory is obviously unsatisfactory. He attempts a synthesis, based on the analysis of Socrates, but it is only by neglecting important elements in education that he succeeds, and the elements which he neglects are precisely those elements, which the Greek, of all people, was disposed to emphasize. In fact he tried 'to put back the hands of the clock,' and a strict interpretation of his theory necessarily yields an education which is thoroughly un-Greek. It was left to a greater than Xenophon to attempt a new synthesis, which, while retaining the same general point of view, would include all the elements.

PLATO (427-347 B.C.).

Aristocles, afterwards surnamed Plato, it is said because of the breadth of his shoulders, came into the world almost contemporaneously with the departure from it of Pericles. His life therefore began at the very time when the Athenian State had reached the zenith of its splendour and fame. Belonging to a wealthy and noble Athenian family, Plato had the best education which Athens could at that time afford. During his youth he is said to have been distinguished for his brilliance, not only in intellectual pursuits, but also in gymnastics and physical exercises. He is also said to have made in his youth several attempts in poetry, epic, lyric, and dramatic. At the age of twenty he came under the influence of Socrates. He thereupon gave up poetry, burned his poems, and thenceforward, throughout a long life, devoted himself to philosophy.

The death of Socrates at the hands of the Athenian democracy aroused in Plato, an aristocrat by birth, temperament, and education, an intense hatred of anything that savoured of mob government, an effect we have already seen produced on the mind also of Xenophon. He retired for some time to Megara, and then, apparently without returning to Athens, set out on

an extended tour, during which he is said to have visited Asia Minor, Egypt, Cyrene, Sicily, and Italy. It must be noted that there is much doubt and obscurity with regard to the order and purpose of these journeyings, and several of the stories related of them must be considered as of very dubious authenticity.

It is not certain when Plàto returned to Athens, but about 386 B.C. he began teaching philosophy there in the gardens of the Academy, and in his own garden which adjoined it, founding here the first of the great philosophical schools of Athens, the true beginning of university life in Europe. Except for two further brief visits to Sicily, which are indeed not too well authenticated, at least as regards details, Plato remained teaching philosophy at Athens till his death in 347 B.C. He taught without remuneration and took no part in public affairs. At his death he bequeathed his property to his school, thus giving it a permanence hitherto possessed by no school of philosophy at Athens.

The reputed works of Plato consist of Dialogues and Letters, but the Letters are now generally regarded as spurious, and doubts have also been cast on many of the Dialogues. For the student of education the most interesting of the Dialogues are the *Protagoras*, the *Republic*, and the *Laws*, especially the second. But the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Meno*, and the *Euthydemus* also deal with certain aspects of education, and more especially criticize destructively existing theories and practice.

Plato's fame rests of course in the first instance on his eminence as a philosopher, and any account of Plato, which ignored the Platonic philosophy, would be hopelessly incomplete even for the student of education. It must not, however, be forgotten, as it too often is, that Plato also takes rank with the greatest of educationists. Plato's philosophy takes its rise on the negative side from a criticism of the philosophical views of the Sophists, for, however much they denied philosophy,

they nevertheless philosophized. There is also criticism, more or less indirect, of the Socratic thought. He points out that, by adopting the subjectivist standpoint, we are left without either truth or knowledge, as the Sophists themselves hold, but that this involves us in a conflict with Reason itself, since contrary statements can be made with regard to one and the same thing. He shows further that such a conclusion is really involved in any theory that is founded on the ordinary notions of everyday life, which are hopelessly inadequate and often self-contradictory. The same holds of the ordinary conceptions with regard to right and wrong action. In so far as these conceptions are based on custom or rule of thumb, we have no guarantee that they are sound and accurate. The negative result of Plato's whole argument is that neither the current conceptions, nor the doctrines of the Sophists, nor even the philosophy of Socrates—though he has done invaluable services in pointing out the right way—can be held to have succeeded in grasping the truth, or even establishing a criterion for it.

The positive side of Plato's philosophy is not quite so easy to grasp or to summarize. He holds that the necessary starting-point of a true philosophy is the true point of view, and, to this, only one, who has the philosophic impulse, as he calls it, can rise. The possessor of the philosophic impulse, according to Plato, is a lover of humanity as well as of wisdom, one who has the desire to lead others to the possession of true knowledge, as well as to possess it himself. In this connection Plato first indicates the nature and need of education. The philosophic impulse is a natural gift, but it requires to be nourished, and it is nourished by learning. True learning, however, is not of such knowledge as is derived from the senses, for sense perception does not instruct in any true sense. The desire for learning, which is characteristic of the philosophic impulse, must be directed towards knowledge of the true and the beautiful, which alone afford the requisite nourishment. Such

a subject as Music, for example, would answer this requirement. Or again, such a subject as Mathematics, since it tends to direct our minds away from the sensible to the abstract, and may therefore be regarded as intermediate between knowledge of the sensible and knowledge of the ultimate truth, of the permanent reality, which is for Plato the world of Ideas. The most important branch of learning is of course Philosophy itself, but the necessary preparation for this is to be obtained from such subjects as Music, Mathematics, and Science.

What is this Platonic world of Ideas, and what is its significance for Plato's philosophy and educational theory? The theory of Ideas may be regarded as the line of advance which Plato proposes from the scepticism in which previous philosophy had involved itself, the solution which he offers to the problem of the One and the Many, Being and Becoming, with which previous philosophers had attempted in vain to grapple. Plato tries to find real existence, and a constructive principle, in the One which is in and above the Many, the identical in and above the changing. This identical element Plato calls by different names at different times. Sometimes it is 'what a thing really is' (*οὐτως ὄν*), at other times 'essence' (*οὐσία*) or 'essential nature' (*αὐτὸ τὸ*). But the term which is most closely identified with the Platonic philosophy is 'form' (*εἶδος*) or 'idea' (*ιδέα*). Where we speak of Plato's Ideas, he usually employs the words 'forms' (*εἶδη*). The term is applied to that which makes individual things what they are, e.g. that which makes a table a table, or a man a man. The Idea therefore signifies the essential nature, and that is determined by the function and purpose of a thing.

The first principle of the universe, or the ultimate purpose, in which are combined and, as it were, concentrated all the other purposes, the purpose of the purposes, the end of ends, Plato terms the Good or the IDEA. The Good and the Ideas in relation to it and to one another constitute, for Plato, a world or universe which is rational. Although Plato himself speaks

of this as a mystical, supersensible world, existing apart from the sensible world, and yet somehow causing and explaining the sensible world, and certainly fails to mediate between the two, we may, without doing violence to the general tenour of the Platonic thought, especially as regards education, consider the Ideas simply as laws or principles of nature. Each object in the visible world is then regarded as the meeting place—and it is this that constitutes the essential nature of the object—of innumerable laws of nature. To a perfect intelligence, to whom all these laws of nature are known, the real world of nature is the world of Ideas.

In his conception of the Good we have the central principle, not only of Plato's metaphysics, but also of his ethics. To get a clear idea of Plato's meaning, we must, in the first place, lay aside all those moral associations, which belong to the word 'good,' as we use it. 'The good' to a Greek did not necessarily involve any moral qualities, nor was it by any means confined to human life. Originally it must have meant simply the desirable, the object of volition, the end or aim at any moment. Man, as a rational being, cannot help aiming at something, and acting with a view to some end or 'good.' From the idea of end the transition was easy to the idea of function. The term 'good' then became applicable to any object whatsoever. Every object has its 'good,' or true function, determined by the end it subserves, and knowledge of this function is the only real knowledge of the object. This is the root idea of the word 'good' as Plato uses it.

The problem of moral philosophy is evidently to determine the true end or 'good' of man. Similarly the problem of moral education is to secure that the end or ends, which a man posits for himself, coincide with the end or ends so determined. A man lives a moral life when he performs his true function in a universe as rationally conceived. Just as the 'Virtue' of a thing is that quality which makes it good of its kind, makes it fulfil well its own proper function, so the virtue of a man is

that quality which makes him do his work well, and fill the place and perform the function assigned to him in the world. It is easy to see how, and in what sense, Plato assented to the Socratic proposition that 'Knowledge is Virtue.' It is clearly important that a man should be enlightened as to his true end or 'good,' because the true excellence of a man is an excellence in the sphere of intelligence, mind, or Reason, and the more a man sees his end or purpose in all its relations, the more will his life be intelligent on his own part and intelligible to others, the more will he attain the proper virtue of a man.

But while clearing up the Socratic teaching in this matter, and expressing it in the form 'perfect virtue is perfect wisdom,' Plato quite recognizes that this represents what must be regarded as the final stage in moral education, or moral development, a stage which, in its completeness, is beyond the range of humanity, and which only comparatively few can attain at all. It was clear to Plato, as apparently it had not been clear to Socrates, that thus to identify philosophic insight with virtue was to go beyond the ordinary moral consciousness of Greece, and that there was a lower kind of virtue, ordinary civic virtue, which consisted in the control of appetites and desires under a sense of duty, and was a characteristic of many men who had never, and could never have, attained the philosophic insight necessary for perfect virtue. Moreover this perfect virtue must be based upon, and to a large extent must manifest itself through, this lower virtue, through the commonly recognized 'cardinal virtues.'

The account which Plato gives of this lower ordinary virtue is largely psychological. The human soul consists of three parts or elements—Plato sometimes speaks as if there were three different souls—Reason, spirit, and appetite. By 'spirit' (*θυμός*) he understands the basis in the mind of courage and pugnacity, emulation, and ambition. There is a further subdivision of appetites into those which are capable of regulation and those which are incurably lawless. In the virtuous man

there is a 'harmony' of these elements. By 'harmony' he means the entire suppression of the lower appetites, and the subordination of the other impulsive elements to Reason. But this notion implies reference to some criterion, and with regard to this it must be confessed that Plato's teaching is never very definite or clear. This 'harmony' of the soul rests on two things, natural disposition and education. Plato holds, therefore, that civic virtue, for itself, and as the basis of the perfect virtue which is perfect insight, is to be attained only through training and discipline, practice and habit. He is quite clear that mere intellectual culture will not suffice for the development of this phase of morality.

The passage from this habitual morality to moral insight, and from sense-perception to true knowledge, Plato represents, in the *Republic*, by his figure of the twice divided line, leading up to the allegory of the Den. He figures a vertical straight line, beginning in total darkness at one end, and passing up to perfect light at the other. This line is divided into two main divisions, standing for the visible and intelligible worlds respectively, or for opinion (δόξα) and true knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Each part is subdivided into two sections. We have, therefore, four stages of mental development, corresponding to the four divisions of the line, and these stages Plato calls 'conjecture' (εἰκασία), 'assurance' (πίστις), 'understanding' (διάνοια), and 'knowledge' (νόσις or ἐπιστήμη).

At the stage of development which Plato calls 'conjecture,' we obtain the most superficial view of the world, the view which involves the least true knowledge. We are in the state of 'conjecture,' when we are content with a superficial and secondhand acquaintance with things. It is not an essentially degenerate or vicious condition into which some men have fallen, but the ordinary state in which most men are, from which they can only escape by means of education. The word which Plato employs to describe the next stage of development may be translated 'faith,' 'belief,' 'assurance,' or 'a feeling of certainty.'

In this condition the mind has come into direct contact with individual objects, or acts, but, from want of knowledge of the underlying principles, cannot give any rational account of them, and is therefore still in a state of mere 'opinion.' Like 'conjecture' this is not an essentially bad state, but merely one from which the reason of man naturally seeks to escape. It is in fact the stage corresponding to ordinary civic virtue. As before, education is the means by which advance is rendered possible.

The third stage Plato describes by a word which may be translated 'understanding' or 'intellect,' but which, in this connection, means rather 'a scientific view of things.' There are, he says, two characteristic marks of this stage. In the first place, it differs from the lower stages, in that, though it is concerned with sensible things, it treats them as symbols of that which is not sensible but rational, as symbols of 'those abstractions which a person can only see with the eye of thought' (*ἀ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ*). In the second place it differs from the higher stage, in that it reasons from hypotheses, that is, from truths assumed without any attempt at explanation, which lie at the basis of the sciences, and are taken for granted by them. This fourth and highest stage is perfect knowledge, insight, and wisdom. This is the sphere of pure Reason. Its attainment is only an ideal, but only in its attainment can the divine impulse, which is within the philosophic nature, find satisfaction, and Philosophy is therefore the attempt to realize it as far as possible. At this stage of development we have the knowledge of a connected and rational universe, a knowledge not of sensible things, but of Ideas, finding their ultimate explanation and organic inter-relations in the Absolute Idea or Good.

As we have indicated, Plato's whole educational theory, at least its essential line of thought, is involved in his philosophy. His main positions are that education must be considered as the preparation, primarily, for efficient life as a citizen, and

following from this, that the essential thing is character, character which is produced by the right training, but is not perfected till habit has given place to insight. His general conception of the process is best expressed, as Nettleship has pointed out, by the word 'nurture.' He conceives of the human soul, and more especially of the highest element in it, the philosophic impulse, as a living thing, which may be fed or starved, nourished or poisoned. Sometimes he compares the growth of the soul to the growth of a plant, dependent for its perfection on the soil and surroundings. At other times he compares it to the growth of an animal, which depends for its development on the pasture on which it feeds.

Such a conception of the nature of the soul and its development at once establishes a certain kinship between Plato and educational theorists of the modern world like Rousseau and Froebel, and, as in their case, it leads Plato to lay very great emphasis on the influence of environment, and on the fact that the development is a development from within. According to this view, it is not the function of the educator to put knowledge into the soul, so much as to develop the best that is latent in the soul itself, by surrounding it with an environment of the right kind. Plato emphasizes this especially in connection with the first stage of education, corresponding more or less to the stage of the elementary school. When he comes to deal with higher education, he supplements this conception to some extent by his metaphor of turning the eye of the soul towards the light. This does not involve any essential change in the general conception. It is merely the manner in which he pictures the mode of bringing the soul into contact with its own proper environment, when that environment is no longer the world of sense-perception, or of the ordinary moral consciousness.

For Plato the problem of education throughout is to give the soul the right surroundings, and secure as far as possible

that it is brought into the right relations with these surroundings. The keywords of early education are, for him, imitation and example, of later education, insight. His education is a process by which the soul, at first through imitation, and habituation, later through philosophic insight, assimilates itself—or perhaps we might say accommodates itself—to its environment.

In two of Plato's Dialogues—the *Republic* and the *Laws*—we get a fairly complete and systematic development of his educational ideas. In the *Republic*, the greatest of the Platonic Dialogues, Plato sketches a perfect society, that is an ideal society where justice, or the best life, might be fully realized. In his reaction against Athenian institutions, he exaggerates many of the Spartan characteristics. The ideal State is organized on a communistic basis. Family life is entirely eliminated. All children belong to the State, and are taken in charge by the State from their birth, being brought up by State nurses. But the essential characteristic of the perfect society is that it is a society in which wisdom rules. There are three grades in the society. Slaves and those who pursue mechanical occupations for the sake of gain constitute the lowest grade, and are entirely excluded from the rights of citizenship and from the education which prepares for citizenship. The other two classes, forming the citizen body, are the warrior class and the ruling class, the latter being the wisest men in the State, or the philosophers. The course of education not only prepares the individuals of these classes for their several functions, but is also selective of the individuals, who in virtue of natural abilities, disposition, or character, ought to belong to each class and to perform certain specific functions in the State. Plato himself, doubtless, quite realized the Utopian character of his ideal State, but this does not seem to affect fundamentally his educational principles.

The primary function of education is to fit the young to become efficient members of such a society. Plato is merely expressing one of the most fundamental characteristics of Greek

education in taking up such a position. He may be said to be a thorough-going utilitarian in the sense that he holds the aim of education to be, first of all, the making of the individual an efficient member of society. He maintains that individual development is by no means an end in itself, or an absolute 'good,' but only an end in relation to the higher end, the prosperity and wellbeing of the State. Here once more he is making clear the Socratic teaching. But Plato is still further utilitarian in so far as he holds that education should prepare definitely for special functions in the State, such functions as are necessary for its existence. He finds his escape from the narrowness to which this narrower utilitarianism leads in his philosophy. In a perfect society, it does not matter whether we consider the true end of the individual or the true end of the society as a whole, since the two coincide, or at any rate are realized together. And further, in his wider utilitarianism, he succeeds in retaining the equally characteristic Greek conception of culture, since that not only determines the various grades in the society, but it is the condition of efficiency of the ruling class.

The whole course of a complete education Plato divides into two great periods, separated from one another by an interval of two years to be devoted to severe gymnastics and military training. The first period of education is intended for all citizens, the second only for a very special class, those who are to be the rulers of the State. For the first period Plato practically accepts the means of education employed at Athens in his day, Music, including Letters, and Gymnastics. He thinks that, in this matter, 'men have builded better than they knew.' The only addition he would make is the teaching of science in an informal manner, and it is not very clear what he means by this. The second period is devoted to a higher education in Science and Philosophy, university culture. Though this education appears in the *Republic* as a kind of

afterthought, it is clearly involved in his whole underlying philosophical position.

✓ The problem of education for Plato is, in the first instance, to develop civic virtue, and his attitude as a social reformer becomes very prominent, so much so that it often seems to lead him into exaggerated views, which detract somewhat from the value of his educational thought. As a matter of fact, in considering Art and Literature in relation to education, Plato is immediately launched into the consideration of larger questions, some of which, from our point of view, distinctly belong to the sphere of Art rather than that of educational theory. The one point that must be kept clearly in view, with regard to Plato's treatment of these larger questions, is, that it is not Art or Literature as such, that he is primarily concerned with, but Art and Literature in their bearing upon education, the educational influence of Art and Literature, wherever and however that manifests itself, and the principles which ought to guide our selection of Art and Literature for this purpose. It must be remembered, however, that Plato would undoubtedly maintain, that, whatever principles we lay down in this connection, these are generally valid, for Art and Literature must always be regarded from this point of view, which is indeed the sole point of view from which they can be regarded. Of course he considers education in a much wider sense than mere school education, and, if the State is to take control of this wider education, the same principles must to a certain extent be applied to Literature and Art as a whole. These principles, which Plato lays down, are four: (1) that they represent what is true, (2) that they represent what is worthy, (3) that they be not excessively stimulating or emotional, and (4) that the style be simple and harmonious, not intricate and elaborate. He would apply the same principles, *mutatis mutandis*, to gymnastics. Such principles may not be entirely satisfactory, when applied to Art and Literature as such, but there can be little doubt that they are in the main sound,

when we apply them to our choice of Art, Literature, or any other subject, for school use.

The interval of two years of physical and military training between the early and later education implies the retention by Plato of the Athenian 'ephebic' training. The training, according to his scheme, is to be of so severe a type, that all intellectual activity must, for the time, be suspended. This will appear, to most educationists, a weak spot in the scheme, but it is interesting to find Plato insisting on compulsory military training as essential from the educational, no less than the military point of view.

In Book VII. of the *Republic*, connecting itself directly with the famous allegory of the Den, we have Plato's discussion of the education of the ruling class. His problem is now to develop the soul, through the stage of 'understanding,' to the stage of 'knowledge' or insight, and from ordinary civic virtue to that perfect virtue which coincides with Wisdom. In the allegory form, the problem of education is to bring those who are to rule the State into the world of reality, and to enable them to look at the sun of this world, which is the 'Good.' In some respects this scheme of higher education, intended for a very special class, is more important, in other respects less important, than the scheme of early education. It is more important because we have here Plato's deepest teaching concerning education, and his widest conception of what it means and implies. It is less important, in proportion as it is less practicable, and in so far as it is based upon, and considerably modified by, Plato's unrealizable dream of a State governed by philosophers. The fundamental thought, underlying it, is still that education is the only means of social salvation, and now it appears that the first and essential measure of social reform is to secure that the leaders of society should have true insight.

Plato begins his sketch of higher education by reviewing the education which the pupils have already received. At

first he seems to turn round and criticize the prevailing education, which he had previously seemed to accept. Education, he says, is not like putting sight into blind eyes, but like turning the eyes to the light. Education, in the prevailing theory, is thought of as a process of giving so-called knowledge to the soul. But true knowledge is only obtained when the soul sees for itself, and the function of education is really to put the soul into such a situation that it cannot but see and know. Further, education involves more than the intellect; it means turning the whole soul another way, involving feeling, emotion, will, character, the whole nature. What Plato is really criticizing is the popular view, and the view of the Sophists, not the prevailing practice itself. According to him the sole aim of the early part of education is to cause the soul, through habituation, to assimilate itself to what is best in the world, and to come into possession of a strong, harmonious, and beautiful character.

He goes on to show that, in all this previous education, there has been no real learning, no attainment of real knowledge, no actual contact with reality. He therefore proceeds to develop a scheme by which men are to be brought out of the condition symbolized by the prisoners in the Den, which is the condition in which all men are, while at the level of mere sense-perception and the current notions of morality, into a true knowledge of the world of reality, of the Reason which is at the heart of things, and of the Good which presides over the destinies of the universe. To the question, What are we to teach men further, in order to secure this end? Plato answers by sketching out a course, which remained for many centuries the course of university study, the Quadrivium, leading up to Philosophy.

That state of 'bewilderment' or 'perplexity' (*ἀπορία*), which we have already met with in connection with the Socratic method, is, with Plato, the first step towards true knowledge, in that it first brings into consciousness the need

of progress beyond mere sense-perception. It is the stage that intervenes between unreflecting sense-perception and thought, or between morality based on mere opinion and habit, and a morality based on principles or laws. The contradictions and inconsistencies of sense-perception and of our ordinary notions of morality raise problems for thought, which must be solved, if we are not to sink into the apathy of universal scepticism. Men must therefore, in the first place, be trained to think, and in the second place, they must attain a knowledge of these principles or laws or ideas, which constitute the only permanent reality. These two educational aims are attained by means of Mathematics and the Sciences, leading up to the study of Philosophy.

The course of higher study which Plato proposes falls into two parts. The first part consists of Arithmetic, as the Science of Number, Plane Geometry, Solid Geometry, Astronomy, and Harmonics. This is the order of relative complexity, and therefore the order in which these branches of science ought to be studied. The culmination of the whole course of education is in the study of Philosophy, by means of which men ultimately arrive at that knowledge which is at once Insight, Wisdom, and Virtue. It is not the least of Plato's merits, that he has attempted, however unsuccessfully, to show the significance of the highest culture for the true welfare of society.

The principles which Plato lays down in the *Laws* are in most respects similar to those of the *Republic*. He, however, makes several modifications in his scheme as a whole, which affect more or less his system of education. For example he retains the family, and, on this account, finds a place for home education before the age of seven, at which age the State takes charge of the children. Then he drops his idea of a philosophic ruling class, and accordingly we find the higher education relegated to a much more subordinate position. Further, in many of the details of his scheme, he shows Spartan influence

to a still greater extent. Thus he advocates the appointment of a Minister of Education, the institution of public meals, the establishment of state schools, with state-paid teachers, both male and female, and generally he approximates to the kind of system we find afterwards in Aristotle. It is interesting to find him also advocating education from the third year by means of regulated and organized games, and the separate education of boys and girls from the sixth year.

Before leaving Plato, we may sum up the main ideas underlying his educational teaching, as a whole. These are four.

1. The great aim of education is the efficiency of the State, and of the individual as a necessary element in that.

2. A complete education must, at the same time, satisfy all the demands of human nature.

3. The process of education continues as long as the soul is capable of growth, and is therefore coextensive with life.

4. The means of education are all those things which humanity in the course of its evolution and history has produced. Religion, art, science, philosophy, literature, law, institutional forms, must all be enlisted in the service of education; each has its proper function, and there is no conflict between them.

In spite of the obvious imperfections of his theory, which are mainly of the form of 'impracticabilities,' Plato must be considered as the first and greatest of the real Humanists, and his *Republic* as one of the noblest and most inspiring of all books on education.

CHAPTER III

THE SUMMING UP OF GREEK EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT BY ARISTOTLE

PLATO had succeeded in reintroducing, as an essential element into his system of educational thought, the idea of intellectual culture as part of the aim of education, the idea which, we may say, was characteristic, above all else, of the Greek genius. He had striven also to reconcile this with the idea, also characteristically Greek, of efficient citizenship as the main aim of education. But he cannot be held to have satisfactorily combined these two aims, which we may call, for the sake of brevity, the culture aim and the efficiency aim. Plato resolved the opposition between the two aims by making the efficiency aim the ultimate and supreme one, and then attempting to show how the culture aim was necessary to its complete attainment. That is to say the culture aim was merely contributory to the highest excellence of the State, and therefore to the attainment of the efficiency aim. But Plato's arguments are entirely unconvincing, both when he attempts to show how the highest intellectual culture is necessary for the State, and still more when he tries to show how those who have received this highest culture will be induced to take an active part in the life of citizenship, which is obviously a necessary outcome of the whole system, if it is to be regarded as a successful solution of the problem. Evidently Plato was himself conscious of this weak point in his theory, for in the

Laws, as we have seen, he makes but slight mention of the higher education, which is given so prominent a place in the *Republic*.

It is clear that there is another possible solution—indeed, other two possible solutions. It may be possible to show that culture and efficiency, if both are rightly understood, really involve one another. Or, taking culture as the ultimate aim, we may attempt to show how efficiency is contributory to, and necessarily involved in, the attainment of that end. This latter was the solution offered by Aristotle, and such a solution is, at once, the summing up of what Greek education really stands for, and the final outcome of Greek educational thought. The former solution is that towards which modern educational theory is tending.

ARISTOTLE (384–322 B.C.).

Aristotle was born at Stagira in Thrace in 384 B.C. He came to Athens early, and up to his thirty-seventh year, was under the influence and instruction of Plato. On the death of Plato in 347 B.C., Aristotle left Athens, and for some twelve years devoted himself to study abroad, chiefly in Asia Minor and Macedonia. In 335 B.C. he returned to Athens, and established his school of philosophy in connection with the Lyceum, where he remained teaching philosophy practically till his death in 322 B.C.

In spite of the contrast, which most writers attempt to draw, between Plato and Aristotle, there is, except with regard to one point, comparatively little essential difference between their educational views. Of such differences as there are, there are four main sources. In the first place Aristotle approaches most of his problems in a different way from Plato, and occasionally the method of approach involves some slight differences in the positions finally reached. In the second place, while Plato's ideal State is an aristocracy, Aristotle,

though holding that the monarchical form of government is theoretically the best, advocates a republic, because it is the form least liable to abuse. Consequently his main educational problem itself comes to be different from Plato's. In the third place, Aristotle rejects Plato's communistic proposals, and with his retention of family life, retains also home education, marking in this respect an undoubted advance on Plato's views. At the same time Aristotle agrees with Plato in advocating the appointment of a Minister of Education, the institution of public meals, and various other changes of a similar description. Finally in his conception of the End of education, and his introduction into the discussion of education of the idea of 'leisure,' and its right use, Aristotle differs considerably, at least so far as explicit teaching is concerned, from all other and previous Greek theorists. This is really Aristotle's main contribution to educational thought, and it leads him to differ from Plato as regards several other less significant, but by no means insignificant points, e.g. in the rejection of Plato's attitude towards Homer and poetry generally.

Though Aristotle's educational theory is less dependent than Plato's on his general philosophical teaching, it is closely bound up with his ethical and political philosophy, as we should naturally expect. In his *Nicomachean Ethics* and his *Politics* we have the development of this ethical philosophy, and the same books contain the main principles of Aristotle's educational thought. The relations of ethics, politics, and educational theory to one another are very simple. Ethics is the introduction to politics, and educational theory is an important branch of politics. All three really constitute one comprehensive department of philosophical thought.

In the discussion of this great department of philosophy, Aristotle begins by seeking to determine the problem of Ethics. This is to find the highest Good. But Aristotle is careful to point out that it is not the Absolute Good which he seeks, but the highest attainable Good. That being determined, we

must seek to discover by what means man may attain it. Aristotle finds the highest Good in happiness (εὐδαιμονία). He therefore defines Virtue as the activity of a rational being which leads to happiness, the happiness of a rational being. He is careful also to point out that this happiness is not a state, but an activity. 'Good living,' 'noble activity,' 'a perfect and self-sufficing life,' 'happiness' are to Aristotle synonymous terms, which may all be employed to express the chief Good of man. \ Happiness may, therefore, be said to mean for him the complete and harmonious development of a human being, in the unimpeded activity of his moral and intellectual nature, realizing his proper excellence or Virtue.

Aristotle points out that such happiness implies a certain amount of worldly prosperity, a certain sufficient share of external 'goods.' But these things are only 'goods' at all in so far as they are means towards the attainment of the ultimate Good, and are used aright as such. The essence of man's happiness lies in the activity. This is the first point, which it is important for us to remember in connection with Aristotle's conception of 'leisure.'

Aristotle's classification of the virtues is on a psychological basis. He distinguishes in the soul of man two elements, the irrational and the rational. His further subdivision of the irrational is of no particular importance from the educational point of view. The virtues fall into two corresponding main groups. In so far as the soul's desires are moulded by Reason into harmonious activities—Aristotle defines this more closely by his doctrine of the 'mean'—in so far as the rational guides and controls the irrational, the *moral, ethical, or practical* Virtue of the soul is attained. In the employment of Reason itself, in the sphere of the rational alone, the soul attains what Aristotle calls its *intellectual or dianoetic* Virtue. This latter is the higher excellence, as the rational is higher than the commingling of rational with irrational.

Plutarch puts the difference between the two kinds of

Virtue very well, when he says that 'moral virtue differs from dianoetic by having the emotions for its content and reason for its form.' The difference is practically that which Plato draws between civic virtue and the perfect Virtue which is insight. According to Aristotle's view, it is when a man lays aside the necessary incompleteness of his active life, and devotes himself to the attempt to attain a speculative insight into the Reason which pervades the universe, that he exercises his noblest activity, and reaches his highest excellence. This is a second point, which, as we shall see, bears directly upon Aristotle's doctrine of the right use of leisure.

We have already indicated that Aristotle's *Ethics* is merely introductory to his *Politics*. The Greeks always regarded Ethics as the theoretical, and Politics as the practical or applied aspect of the same science. We must remember also that Greek thinkers always conceived of the State as an organism, and Aristotle, though he makes more of the individual than previous thinkers, is no exception in this respect. Now, in an organism the parts are really what they are, only so far as they are parts of the organism, and perform their function as such. Hands and eyes are only hands and eyes, so long as they are parts of the body, and perform their proper functions as parts of the body. Cut off the hand from the body and it is no longer a hand; destroy the power of functioning of the eye and it is no longer an eye. We have already met this thought in Plato, that the essence of a thing is its function, its activity in attaining its own end. From this conception follows the necessity for differentiation and specialization in the 'parts' of the State, or the individual citizens, as regards their functions. Inequalities, therefore, among the 'parts' of a State are not imperfections, or 'unjust,' but natural and necessary. Now, certain 'parts' of the State share in the life of the whole in a much more intimate way than other parts, in that they realize in themselves its end, while the other 'parts' are mere means or necessary conditions for the realizing of the

end. In this distinction we have a basis for the limitation of the rights of citizenship. Only the former can be considered the real citizens, who exercise the functions of government, defence, and the like, for these alone know and aim at the real ends of the State.

Only in society is morality possible, and only through the State can man realize his true destiny. The realization of the chief Good or happiness of the individual citizen is so far the realization of the chief Good or happiness of the State, because it involves, and indeed means, his activity in performing his own proper function, and at least part of this is his civic function. We say 'at least part' because, quite obviously, it is only in realizing his ethical or practical, not his dianoetic, excellence, that man is performing a civic function, and this is, after all, in Aristotle's view, only preliminary, though a necessary condition, to the realization of man's highest excellence. That happiness, therefore, which is the end of individual and State alike, is partly in good citizenship. So long as we do not look beyond practical Virtue, good citizenship may be said to be an end in itself. But it is obvious that grave difficulties for Aristotle's theory of dianoetic Virtue will arise just here, when we come to discuss ultimate questions, and this is a third point to keep in view in connection with his teaching concerning the right use of 'leisure.'

We can now take up the consideration of Aristotle's characteristic and central position with regard to 'leisure.' Primarily and fundamentally, the right use of 'leisure' is, with Aristotle, simply the living of the noblest, highest, worthiest, or divinest life, whatever that may be. Such a life implies in him who leads it freedom from the necessity of attending to the satisfaction of lower needs and wants, a freedom, which, we may remark in passing, is evidently attainable in two ways. It implies further that all conflict in the ethical or practical sphere has been transcended. Aristotle by using the term 'leisure' tends to lay most stress on the first

condition. He points out that labour is undertaken for the purpose of satisfying such lower needs, and a life of labour will therefore necessarily exclude participation in the highest life. As Aristotle expresses it, the life of labour does not do what is noble, but merely provides what is necessary. Accordingly Aristotle, as a Greek, excludes from citizenship, not only the slaves, who provide by their labour necessities for an individual, but also all tradesmen, day-labourers, artisans, and the like, who provide necessities for society. All these are 'mechanical' (*βάναυσοι*). It is impossible to admit such to citizenship, because their activity is directed towards the satisfaction of other people's wants, not towards the improvement of character and the attainment of Virtue, and hence their lives cannot help being ignoble. The ends they seek are unworthy of a free man or of a rational being.

It is pretty obvious that this is not the only spirit in which work may be done. And further, there are kinds of work, which, on Aristotle's own principles, would be the right use of 'leisure.' The modern attitude is in many respects very different from the Greek. Nevertheless we can go a great way with Aristotle. His 'leisure' is by no means equivalent to idleness, but is merely a higher labour, or at least a higher activity, in seeking to realize the highest life.

When Aristotle finds this highest life in 'contemplation' (*θεωρία*), philosophical speculation, scientific research, or culture, the modern can follow him no longer, and is compelled to part company from him. So long as we keep humanity in our field of vision, we cannot help seeing that Aristotle's own ethical philosophy falls asunder, both in theory and in practice, with such an interpretation of the highest life. Antagonism cannot but arise between practical and dianoetic Virtue, and between the claims of the individual and the claims of the State. Confirmation of this is found in the subsequent history of the philosophical sects at Athens, which is an interesting commentary on Aristotle's position.

As with Plato, the problems of education naturally present themselves, when Aristotle is discussing his ideal State in the *Politics*. The question arises, how is this ideal to be realized? And the only possible answer is 'through education.' The fundamental problem of *Politics* is therefore to Aristotle an educational problem. A State is virtuous only in the virtue of its individual citizens, and hence the main problem is to determine the means by which the individual citizen becomes virtuous. Virtue depends partly, it is true, on natural endowment, and the right nature must be presupposed. But it depends also on habit and insight, and these are the work of education.

The aim of education, then, according to Aristotle, is Virtue or Excellence, in the widest sense, and this Virtue rests, in the first instance, on a good natural disposition, secondly on the development of the right habits of thought and action, and lastly on rational insight. This position really involves Aristotle's solution of the Greek moral education controversy. Essentially he agrees with Plato, but he is much clearer and more emphatic as regards the part which training plays in the development of practical morality. Aristotle teaches explicitly that moral goodness is a condition of the soul, and the only way to produce such a condition is by training in actions of the same kind as those actions that will be performed when the right condition of soul has been attained. The insight is, to begin with, the insight of the educator or lawgiver, who sees the underlying principles. It is only later, when the life rises to the rational level, that it becomes the insight of the educated. Further, the content of practical morality is the ~~feelings, not knowledge~~. Direct instruction cannot therefore take the place of habituation in right action. Moral insight is founded on moral habit. The first step is to train the young from the beginning to feel pleasure and pain in the right kind of things, in order that action so guided may by repetition become an established habit of right conduct.

Aristotle's aim of Virtue or Excellence is, however, much wider than this, and implies much more than mere training in right action. If we analyse it, taking Virtue in the sense in which he uses it, we find that it involves preparation by means of education :

1. For the right use of 'leisure,' that is, as we have seen, for a life truly worthy of a rational being.
2. For the active life of citizenship.
3. For those activities which are indispensable, though not themselves virtuous or noble, in that they render Virtue possible.

In connection with the last, we have Aristotle's very clear and distinct summing up of the case for and against utilitarianism. Obviously, he says, useful studies, which are absolutely indispensable must be taught. But the 'liberal education' must be dominated throughout by the higher aims of education. The end of war is peace, the end of business is leisure, the end of indispensable actions actions which are noble. It is right that man should be able to conduct war and business, but it is still more important that he should be able to enjoy and employ peace and leisure. It is right that he should be capable of actions which are indispensable, but much more important that he should be capable of those which are noble. Moreover a narrow utilitarianism defeats its own ends. Aristotle illustrates this by reference to Spartan education. He points out that history has refuted the eulogists of Spartan education, and has shown that States which, like Sparta, educate primarily with a view to war, and aspire to military success as the highest end, 'lose their temper like steel in time of peace' and ultimately are surpassed by other nations even in those things which they have made their speciality. Precisely similar is the case as regards business and leisure.

Aristotle is not content to accept even the higher and wider utilitarianism, which seeks to prepare for the wider life of citizenship, or, as we should say, for social efficiency. This,

he acknowledges, is part of the Virtue or Excellence of a man, but it is only part. Higher than practical is dianoetic Virtue, and the highest education in that which prepares for the life of 'culture,' to which the duties of active citizenship, important though they are, are subservient. It seems clear that we must in a measure accept Aristotle's principle even here, that there is a higher life than that of citizenship, or that in which a man may be measured by the standard of social efficiency, however far we may differ from him in his conclusions as to what this highest life is, and what the criteria by which we ultimately judge education are.

Aristotle's distinction between a liberal and an illiberal education, and between liberal and illiberal studies, is of permanent value, and it is better to give it in his own words (translation by Burnet): 'It is clear that only such knowledge as does not make the learner mechanical (*βάρανος*) should enter into education. By mechanical subjects we must understand all arts and studies that make the body, soul, or intellect of freemen unserviceable for the use and exercise of goodness. That is why we call such pursuits as produce an inferior condition of body mechanical, and all wage-earning occupations. They allow the mind no leisure, and they drag it down to a lower level. There are even some liberal arts, the acquisition of which up to a certain point is not unworthy of freemen, but which, if studied with excessive devotion or minuteness, are open to the charge of being injurious in the manner described. The object with which we engage in or study them also makes a great difference; if it is for our own sakes, or that of our friends, or to produce goodness, they are not illiberal, while a man engaging in the very same pursuits to please strangers, would in many cases be regarded as following the occupation of a slave or serf.' This is in tone characteristically Greek, and is intended to be in the main an expression of the Greek attitude, but it is comparatively easy to translate it into modern thought.

The fifth book¹ of the *Politics*, from which the above passage has been quoted, contains Aristotle's most detailed discussion of educational problems. As a preliminary he proposes to himself three questions:

1. Is it desirable to have a definite educational system?
2. Should education be regulated by the State or left to the private individual?
3. If there is to be a definite system of education, regulated by the State, what should be its nature?

To the first question Aristotle answers that there should certainly be a definite system of education, since the character of a State must determine, and in its turn be determined by, its educational policy. Moreover education is the only means by which Virtue itself can be acquired, and hence it is a matter of such paramount importance, that it cannot but demand the most careful attention of the legislator. The second question Aristotle again answers affirmatively. Education cannot be left to the caprice of individuals, since it is by means of education that the ends of the State are to be realized. Moreover the education of the individual citizens must be one and the same, at least up to a certain point, because in a democratic State all are in turn rulers and ruled. If rulers were to be permanently rulers and subjects permanently subjects, matters might of course be differently arranged.

In the *Ethics*, when discussing the necessity for a theory of education and a theory of legislation, Aristotle concedes one advantage to private education, viz. the greater opportunity for individual treatment. But he evidently thinks this advantage far outweighed by the disadvantages. And, even when he concedes it, he goes on to point out that the best individual treatment will be given by the professionally qualified teacher. 'To produce a good disposition in any given subject submitted for treatment is not in the power of anybody and everybody, but only, if in anybody's, in that of the scientific

¹ Bekker's order. See Welldon's *Translation of the 'Politics.'*

educator, just as is the case in medicine and in every other art that requires attention and practical wisdom¹. Clearly such a scientific educator will be much more likely to be produced in the case of a State system. The passage in the *Ethics* has an additional interest, in that it is a plea, on the part of Aristotle, for the professional training of the teacher.

The answer to the third question leads to the most directly practical part of the discussion. After criticizing utilitarianism, and defining occupations and studies which are liberal and illiberal, Aristotle passes on to consider the school subjects of the day, and the reasons for teaching them, or the ends which they subserve. Like Plato, Aristotle accepts in the main the current practice in education. The common school subjects, he says, are Gymnastics, Reading, Writing, Music, and, in some cases, Drawing. Reading, Writing, and Drawing are taught for their utility, as indispensable, Gymnastics for the promotion of bravery in war, and Music for the pleasure which it gives. As for the last, it was originally included in the curriculum as an element in the rational enjoyment of leisure, and the importance assigned to it in former days is thus a testimony to the importance of the right use of leisure. All the subjects, however, can be regarded and studied in a liberal as well as an illiberal spirit. Reading and Writing must not be regarded as possessing utility in, and for themselves, but as the indispensable instruments for the acquisition of various other kinds of learning. Drawing should similarly be taught not because of its utility, but because it renders a man 'a scientific observer of physical beauty.'

Aristotle next considers the different stages of education, and agrees on the whole with Plato and with prevailing practice. He distinguishes two great periods of intellectual education, what we might call elementary and higher, the first being preceded by the period of home education, and the two main periods being separated by an interval devoted to the severer

¹ Burnet, *Aristotle on Education*.

forms of physical training. As regards the arrangement of the course, he lays down three general principles :

1. The education of the body should precede the education of the intellect.

2. The education of the habits should precede the education of the Reason.

3. Body and Mind should not be subjected to severe exertion simultaneously.

The discussion of education, which is obviously incomplete, terminates with a fuller treatment of Music, itself not finished. Reverting to the enquiry into the educational value of Music, he supplements his former answer that its primary value is as contributing to the right enjoyment of leisure, by pointing out that it produces certain moral effects. These effects are three. In the first place Music, and all Art, by giving a representation of certain mental states, produces these in the listener. In the second place it produces certain moods. Plato had already noticed these two effects, but several of the errors he makes with regard to the educational influence of Literature, Art, and Music, are due to his overlooking the third effect. This is the effect which Aristotle calls 'purging' (κάθαρσις), and which he makes so much of in the *Poetics*. What exactly the cathartic effect is, has been the subject of much controversy. In all probability, however, Aristotle means that the representation of the emotions by good Art or Music, both affords the necessary outlet to the particular emotions, and also purifies them.

Unfortunately Aristotle's treatment of education terminates at this point. We look in vain for the discussion of higher education, and for the solution of many problems which he himself raises. And, though we could perhaps fill in the gaps in his educational theory pretty much on the main lines that Aristotle himself would have followed, it is hopeless for us to attempt to fill in the details.

The one pre-eminently important lesson, which Aristotle's educational thought emphasizes, is the intrinsic value of the

✓ 'liberal education,' the education that prepares for a life that is worth while. 'Leisure' may seem a somewhat unfortunate term to employ in the high sense in which Aristotle understands it, especially in the strenuous times in which we live, but it is not easy to suggest a better term. In any case we must beware of reading a modern meaning into the word. It is undoubtedly an important thing that men should spend their leisure aright, important from two different points of view, in the first place because it contributes to their efficiency as members of society, and in the second place because it elevates them as men. But though this conception of leisure is contained in Aristotle's, it does not touch Aristotle's central thought, and it is well to remember that the true Gospel of Work, and the principles underlying Aristotle's Gospel of Leisure are not entirely irreconcilable.

CONCLUSION

GREEK educational thought was so complete and all-embracing that it remained valid for centuries. In a measure it remains valid at the present day. But modern civilization and modern thought differ materially from those of the Greek world, and it was inevitable that sooner or later the conclusions of the Greek educational theorists should be challenged. It may not be amiss, therefore, if in conclusion we point out in general terms the main features in which the educational thought of the present is at least different from, if it has not made an advance upon, Greek educational thought. These features are three in number.

In the first place we have developed different conceptions of what social efficiency implies. It could hardly be otherwise, considering the gulf which separates the social life of to-day from the social life of ancient Greece. Perhaps the most obvious difference in the modern as compared with the Greek attitude is our emphasizing of the economic element in social efficiency. But the abolition of slave labour, and the tremendous development at the same time of commercial and industrial life, to say nothing of other less important factors, sufficiently explain this difference. There are, however, still more vital differences, due in the main to the development of modern sociology, either systematic or unsystematic, which has revealed complexities in social problems, and brought into clear light details of social structure, undreamed of by the Greeks.

In the second place we are in the process of developing new ideals of culture. It has within recent times gradually

become more and more evident—the greater educational thinkers recognized it long ago—that culture implies a general outlook upon life, which comes from knowledge of, and contact with, the various phases of the civilization, in which we live, in their typical forms; not of course such a knowledge as the assiduous reader of the newspapers might gain, though that too might have its part, but that knowledge or comprehension which is based upon a deeper insight and sympathy. The conventional culture of the past centuries is in process of being cast aside, as no longer suitable to the present. But though we abandon the forms, it by no means follows that we must abandon the spirit of Greek culture, and it would most certainly be un-Greek to find our highest culture in the study of alien languages, literatures, and civilizations, though it were the language, literature, and civilization of ancient Greece itself.

Finally the principles underlying the methods of education show a vast change from Greek times, and here there has undoubtedly been marked progress. We have had comparatively little to say of the principles of method in Greek education, simply because there was little to be said. Since Rousseau the attitude of educational theory towards the child has entirely changed, and during the last century there has been a great development in our knowledge of psychology. There was much sound method in Greek education, but it was method largely unconscious of its grounds. And to us it is perhaps the most striking defect of Greek educational thought, that we find so little emphasis upon the nature and interest of the child, so little attempt to appreciate the standpoint of the child, the needs of the child, and the natural development of the child. All this is so central in our present-day educational theory, though it must be confessed that our educational practice sometimes lags far behind.

As regards the first and second of these tendencies of modern education, and more especially the second, there is still much to be learned from Greek education. As regards

the third this is not so obvious. But it is well to remember, as several recent educational writers have pointed out, that psychology, even child psychology, can afford us no guidance in education, until we have first determined our end, until we have determined what kind of being we wish our education to produce. This is the first and great problem of educational thought. Psychology does not determine ends; it merely describes processes of attaining ends. And until we know what we would be at, we can receive no assistance from our developed modern psychology.

In spite of the differences between our modern standpoint and the standpoint of the Greeks, Greek educational thought still remains of fundamental importance to the educational student of to-day. There is still another point of view which may be taken. Education can be reformed; it cannot be re-created. We cannot entirely break away from our past in education, and our past is Greek. Even if we were foolish enough to neglect the results of Greek educational thought in developing the educational thought of the present and of the future, our own education of the present binds us to the education of ancient Greece. In addition to the value arising from its permanent freshness, interest, and inspiration, that has an indirect value, therefore, in bringing us to a clearer consciousness of the significance of our educational practice, and a direct value for the constructive educational thought of the twentieth century.

APPENDIX

ISOCRATES AS AN EDUCATIONAL THEORIST

THE plan of the present little book, unfortunately, did not permit of the treatment of Isocrates as a representative of Greek educational thought, for, though he also among the Greeks wrote concerning Education, he has no proper place in the development of that thought from the Sophists to Aristotle. Nevertheless, in order to make this sketch of Greek education complete, some mention of his work in that direction seems desirable. We owe to Isocrates two works on Education, the essay *Against the Sophists* (κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν), and the speech *On the Antidosis* (περὶ ἀντιδόσεως). The former was written about 391 B.C. at the beginning, the latter about 354 B.C., when he was eighty-two years old and nearing the end, of his professional activity as a teacher. Jebb calls them 'the alpha and omega of his professional life.'

The essay *Against the Sophists* is mainly taken up with destructive criticism of the kind of education given by Isocrates' professional rivals. The second part of the essay, devoted to the exposition of his own principles, if it ever existed, is not now extant. What Isocrates criticizes is the pretentiousness of some teachers, who profess for a small fee to impart absolute and universal knowledge, and the vain promises of others to make anybody a good speaker, independently of natural capacity and experience. In order to produce a good speaker, three things, according to Isocrates, are necessary—natural gifts, the proper education, and experience, and, however important it may be, the second is the least important of the three.

In his discourse *On the Antidosis*, we have the principles, upon which Isocrates had based his practice throughout his professional

career, expounded at considerable length, and with illustrations from his own writings. We must not of course take this speech as a systematic exposition of educational theory. At the same time he discusses three of the main topics, viz. the aim of education, where he expounds his ideals of culture, principles of method, and the content of education.

The ideals of culture expressed by Isocrates are in many respects remarkably similar to those of Renaissance Humanism. As with both Plato and Aristotle, the avowed aim of the most advanced education is 'philosophy,' or the highest culture, but the meaning he attaches to the term 'philosophy' is entirely different. For Isocrates 'philosophy' means practical wisdom attained through literary culture (*ἡ τῶν λόγων παιδεία*). When, therefore, he maintains, as in one passage, that philosophy is for the mind what gymnastics is for the body, he refers to the literary and linguistic studies of his own school, not to the philosophy of the philosophical schools. But the ideal is not attained in the mere ability to write well. The Greeks always laid great emphasis on speech. In their schools great attention was given to reading aloud, and to the training of the voice, so much so that we read of a special voice trainer, the *φωνασκός*. Hence the ideal of the man of culture, the man of 'philosophy,' with Isocrates, is in the first instance the man who can speak well and worthily upon worthy topics, and this as a preparation for active participation in civic life. It is well to remember that this is the source of the 'eloquentia,' which we find, in Reformation times, as one of the aims of Sturm's school at Strasburg.

Moreover, the relation of the course of education to the attainment of this ideal was two-fold. In the first place the school supplied the material of knowledge, the thought content, which formed the basis of culture or 'philosophy.' In the second place the effect of the course, from its beginning in the elementary school to its end in the school of Isocrates, was disciplinary. It sharpened the wits and trained the judgment. The combination of results, therefore, produced, so far as the school could produce, the educated man, that is, the man of cultured and also practical judgment able to think clearly and to express his thoughts in choice language.

As regards method, Isocrates practised and advocated a method

considerably in advance of that employed by the Sophists, and one of his chief objections to them is on this head. He lays main emphasis upon the importance of practice. Precept first, that is to say, an exposition of the principles of an art, then practice under the eye of the master, until the necessary facility has been acquired. Many of the Sophists contented themselves with making their pupils commit to memory set speeches, which Aristotle compares to teaching the art of making shoes by placing before the learner a number of finished pairs of shoes. Isocrates is justly severe on such methods. His aim was to get his pupils to make speeches, not to learn them. Another characteristic in this connection is the importance he attaches to thoroughness, and to the production of work which will be of permanent value, solid work.

As regards the content of education, there is little to be said, that has not already been said in the preceding pages. For primary education, reading of the poets and grammar are the important subjects, for secondary, mathematics, astronomy, and eristic, and for higher education, 'philosophy.' As we have already noted, Isocrates adheres to the disciplinary view of education, traces of which we also find in Plato, and the subjects of secondary education mainly subserve the purpose of mental discipline, as a preparation for the highest culture. Above all, education is to be 'practical, rational, and comprehensive.'

It is rather interesting to note the relation of Isocrates to the main line of Greek philosophical and educational thought. In Plato's *Phaedrus* Socrates is made to say:—'He (Isocrates) seems to me to have a genius above the oratory of Lysias and to be endowed with a nobler nature. It will not surprise me, therefore, if, as he advances in years, he makes all who have gone before him seem like children in the kind of oratory to which he is now applying himself; or if, in the event that such an achievement do not satisfy him, some diviner impulse should lead him to yet greater things. My dear Phaedrus, there is a certain philosophy inborn in him.' This was evidently at one time Plato's estimate of Isocrates, and it was to a certain extent a mistaken one. Jebb has suggested an interesting comparison between Isocrates and Xenophon. Both came under the influence of Socrates, and both showed that influence, though by no means to the same extent, in their subsequent careers. Isocrates had many qualities that

Xenophon lacked, and lacked some that Xenophon possessed. At one time he clearly showed evidences of a certain measure of philosophical genius. Yet he never seems to have got beyond the philosophical position of the Sophists, or at all events of Socrates, that absolute knowledge is impossible and that all we can aim at is good or judicious opinion. Then from that point of view he sets himself in direct opposition to the philosophers proper, as, for example, when he declares that it is 'better to have probable opinions about useful things than an exact knowledge of useless things.' And in the *Antidosis* he says:—'I call these men philosophers who give themselves up to studies by means of which they will most quickly acquire practical wisdom.' That he does take up a philosophical position is, therefore, obvious, and the nature of that position is equally unmistakeable. He even denies the possibility of an exact science of his own subject.

Such is the specific educational teaching of Isocrates, one of the great schoolmasters of the world. It is quite consonant with his educational practice, which, we have already seen, has exercised an enormous influence in school education. There is an interesting and important chapter in educational history still to be written on the development of Humanism in school practice from Isocrates to Sturm.

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THE END

Sophists - scepticism - utilitarianism - Virtue
can be taught - = Knowledge.

Socrates - also sceptical as to ultimate knowledge
some opinions more useful - Virtue = knowledge
insight into end & means - practical wisdom
end - right conduct. Ultimate utility - or
moral education. Good disposition & training do
not secure virtue: enlightenment necessary

Xenophon practical aim - to get men to
understand what was right & so live well
moral & military - political & civic -
new prohibitions to be made unnecessary -
supremacy of idea of conduct

Plato philosophic insight & civic virtue: latter
requires nat'l. disposition, & training (cf. Socr.)
conjecture, romance, understanding, knowledge
character to be developed till light gives place to
insight. Nurture - environment. Habituation, insipid
to cause the soul through habituation to
assimilate itself to what is best in the world

Culture - aim & efficiency aim at well harmony
Plato aims at efficiency & shows culture as involving
aim at culture — efficiency —

Aristotle introduces theory of leisure.

Highest (not absolute) good - Happiness - virtue
as activity - moral & intellectual virtues
varied functions (hence limitations) of citizens
leisure - higher labour, or activity,
contemplation - Antagonism betw. 2 kinds
of virtue inevitable. Right nature, but
insight. (Latter founded on habit, not knowledge)
utilitarianism not enough - leisure is important
Definite system necessary - State system
all subjects should be studied - a liberal
education (p 93) - music
& (mental states, mood)

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of gifts, educ., & experience
make a good speaker.
Humanists. Philosophy
or. Precept, then practice
Roballe opinions on work
an exact knowledge - useful
science (essentially sceptical)



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